The call for public scrutiny of the highly private world of Venture Capital saw a crescendo recently with calls for disclosure of some funds' interim IRR performance statistics. There is much that is worth debating about the wisdom of public disclosure of interim fund IRRs, but the recent debate ignores the important point that these IRRs are only as good as the data that goes into calculating them, namely the underlying portfolio company valuations. Interim IRRs do not report a "true" return on a fund's investments. They are an interim report on the performance of the fund and rely on the GPs' assessments of unrealized current portfolio company values. Therefore, it would behoove the discussion over IRR disclosure to strive for a better understanding of what constitutes good practice(s) in assessing interim company valuations. What is central to the real debate is the need for LPs to have confidence in GP valuation practices and to recognize the importance of GP judgment in applying them. The IRRs, publicly reported or not, are only as good as these underlying assessments.
IRRs are a touchy subject with investors. Investors have always been concerned about the understandable incentive of a GP, particularly when fundraising, to put their investment performance in a favorable light. This concern led to much discussion and guidelines aimed at standardizing the information and calculations to be used in computing IRRs. But until the recent market downturn, there was little demand for public disclosure of fund IRR performance and little discussion or debate about the underlying portfolio valuations themselves. This was understandable in an era when IRRs were high and most valuations rose over time.
The UTIMCO Factor
As noted above, IRRs as commonly referred to in the Venture Capital industry, include a current assessment of the value of unrealized investments held in a fund portfolio. Another IRR could be calculated which takes into account only actual cash flows in and distributions out. This is the IRR that would be calculated for a fund after the fund is finally wound up and no unrealized investments remain. If this IRR were calculated over the life of the fund it would not be subject to any debate about interim unrealized values for the portfolio company. But any such calculation implicitly assumes that unrealized investments are being carried at zero value, which would mean that the usual J-curve that shows negative fund returns in early years of a fund would be much more severely negative. Such an IRR would not reflect any of the very real, if hard to assess, value of the unrealized investments. It would not give LPs a sense of the current value of their investment and would also portray the performance of the fund very unfavorably, especially in cases where a GP cuts losses early in an effort to focus money and time on potential winners. For this reason, most LPs and GPs both want to see interim valuation assessments as part of the financial reports to investors. But in current market conditions, it is these interim valuations that cause the problem.
The Valuation Challenge
The attraction of the conventional approach was that it was a simple prescription that required little effort or judgment to assess (apart from the nettlesome "adverse change"). But while easy, these guidelines are increasingly seen as inadequate under today's circumstances. "Staleness" does not look conservative if value is declining and the admonition to do something appropriate under those circumstances is not much guidance. This dilemma is widely recognized and there are a number of efforts underway by both established bodies of LPs and GPs as well as ad hoc industry groups.
Most industry participants would still like to see a prescription that could be easily followed. GPs see their jobs as making good investments and working to make their investments succeed. Spending a lot of time and effort to better assess interim valuations is seen as a potentially large demand of time and attention that will not improve the final outcome of the fund. While understandable, the search for simple prescriptions is counterproductive if a standard and agreed-upon measure of accuracy is the goal. There are many valuation methodologies that can be applied but no one methodology will fit every set of circumstances. Any disclosure of IRRs, regardless of how accurately calculated, would be misleading or misunderstood without recognition of this fact.
Basically, given that the desired end result is an assessment of a company's value at a point in time, the goal is to assess the market value of that entity at that time. Such a "mark to market" or fair market value standard has broad acceptance in principle but has often been seen as difficult to achieve or subject to abuse for investments without a readily available market and a long time horizon. The abuse of such an approach gained much recent attention in the scandals over "marking to market" long term energy contracts.
The Venture Capital industry has a built in advantage that can help with this problem. Generally there is more than one GP investing in a portfolio company. In the past, different VCs may have had different valuation policies and it was difficult to know if differing valuation assessments of a portfolio company were due to different assessments of the company or simply reflected a different policy for valuation. If there is agreement on the principle that the valuation should be an assessment of market value, then differing valuations by VCs should reflect their different assessments of the company, not a mechanistic reliance on a particular "approved" valuation calculation. LPs could then look at differing valuations as differing judgments about a company's health and prospects and not as confusing contradictions that are hard to understand.
Still, the assessment of value for a privately held investment is not simple and requires thoughtful judgment. There are many methodologies that can be applied ranging from use of comparable transactions, public market comparables, variations of discounted cash flow analysis and, of course, the company's own financing experience. These various approaches can lead to widely different valuation assessments and one might be tempted to dismiss the whole idea as hopelessly speculative. But if the underlying principle of market value is agreed upon, then sorting through which approaches are most appropriate in a given situation becomes an exercise in judgment by those in a best position to judge, namely the GPs who are the investors in the portfolio companies. On the other hand, any set of guidelines that could be seen as primarily a list of acceptable prescriptions that could be applied mechanistically would not meet the challenge of today's market environment.
In the end, investors will be best served by an approach to performance reporting that defines a clear standard and places the responsibility for portfolio company valuation judgments on GPs rather than relying on simple prescriptive rules that may be easy to apply but will not capture the best available assessment of the value of the companies.
Colin Blaydon and Michael Horvath are professors at the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth. They are also directors of Tuck's Center for Private Equity and Entrepreneurship. They can be reached at email@example.com.
This article originally appeared in the March 2003 issue of the Venture Capital Journal.