

# Face threat sensitivity in negotiation: Roadblock to agreement and joint gain<sup>☆</sup>

Judith B. White,<sup>a,\*</sup> Renée Tynan,<sup>b</sup> Adam D. Galinsky,<sup>c</sup> and Leigh Thompson<sup>c</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Tuck School, 100 Tuck Hall, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH 03755, USA

<sup>b</sup> University of Notre Dame, USA

<sup>c</sup> Northwestern University, USA

Received 28 December 2001

Available online 13 May 2004

## Abstract

Negotiation scholars and practitioners have long noted the impact of face, or social image, concerns on negotiation outcomes. When face is threatened, negotiators are less likely to reach agreement and to create joint gain. In this paper, we explore individual differences in face threat sensitivity (FTS), and how a negotiator's role moderates the relationship of his or her FTS to negotiation outcomes. Study 1 describes a measure of FTS. Study 2 finds that buyers and sellers are less likely to reach an agreement that is in both parties' interests when the seller has high FTS. Study 3 finds that job candidates and recruiters negotiate an employment contract with less joint gain when the candidate has high FTS, and that this relationship is mediated by increased competitiveness on the part of the high FTS candidates. The results support Deutsch's (1961) application of face theory (Goffman, 1967) to negotiation.

© 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

*Keywords:* Negotiation; Conflict resolution; Face; Face threat sensitivity; Identity; Politeness theory

## Introduction

The importance of face, or social image, in the preservation of well being has long been recognized. Deutsch, for example, called face "one of an individual's most sacred possessions" (1961, p. 897), stating that maintaining face is necessary to sustain one's self-esteem. Negotiations provide a particularly poignant context to explore the impact of face concerns because there are many opportunities for a person's face to be threatened. In this paper, we examine individual differences in how a person responds to the face threats inherent in the task of negotiation, and how this difference

can significantly affect the outcome of a negotiation (Brown, 1968; Deutsch, 1961; Wilson, 1992).

When a person's face is threatened in a negotiation, it can tip the balance of his/her behavior away from cooperation toward competition, resulting in fewer agreements and/or less cooperative agreements. Previous research on face in negotiation has experimentally manipulated situational face threats (Brown, 1968; Deutsch, 1961; Tjosvold, 1977b), or examined negotiation dynamics as aspects of Goffman's dramaturgical approach to interaction (Friedman, 1994). In this paper, we take a different approach, one that relies on individual differences in face threat sensitivity. Specifically, in these studies we examine the relationship between two factors that vary from one negotiation situation to another: face threat sensitivity and the role that a negotiator assumes in a negotiation. We find that a negotiator's face threat sensitivity affects the negotiation process and outcomes when his or her face includes the resources being negotiated, a factor that varies with role.

<sup>☆</sup> This project was funded by a grant from the Dispute Resolution Research Center at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University. Preliminary results from Studies 2 and 3 were presented at the annual conference of the Academy of Management, August 5, 2003.

\* Corresponding author. Fax: 1-603-646-1308.

E-mail address: [judith.b.white@dartmouth.edu](mailto:judith.b.white@dartmouth.edu) (J.B. White).

### Face theory

Goffman defined face as the “positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by his or her self-presentation” (1967, p. 5). Face includes the value to a person of his or her public image, reputation, and status vis-à-vis other people in an interaction. A person’s face, then, is the social value of who and what they hold themselves out to be. For an interaction to proceed smoothly, the parties must allow one another to maintain face. In addition to negotiation, face maintenance affects communication strategy (Carson & Cupach, 2000; Lee, 1993; Leichthy & Applegate, 1991; Linde, 1988; Tracy, 2002), cross-cultural interaction (Earley, 1997; Lindsley & Braithwaite, 1996; Ting-Toomey & Cocroft, 1994) and relationships (Metts, 1997).

### Face is social

The dynamics of face maintenance are determined not only by who and what the individual holds him/herself to be, but also by how others respond to this presentation (Goffman, 1967). Thus, face is a social construct, just as much a property of the social interaction as an attribute of the individual. Maintaining face, therefore, requires the cooperation of others. Other people can, by their verbal and non-verbal behavior, uphold or threaten an individual’s face, accord or deny the positive social value claimed by the individual.

### Face is situated

Face is not necessarily positive, nor is it the same across all situations. This means that face can change from one situation to the next, and that face can have more value in some situations than others. For example, an instructor might rely on a colleague to uphold her face as a competent teacher in front of her students, and later count on that colleague to uphold her face as an entertaining dinner companion. Telling a humorous story about a time she lost her lecture notes could threaten her face in the former situation, but uphold her face in the latter. Moreover, the instructor’s face might have more value when one of the parties to the interaction is someone she particularly wishes to impress. The positive social value of an individual’s face, then, depends not only on the cooperation of others, but also on the precise social situation.

### Threats to face

Given the direct link between face and self-esteem, it makes sense that people are motivated to have their face upheld, and feel thwarted when their face is not upheld, or when it is threatened. People respond to face threats with negative emotion (Goffman, 1967, p. 6), ranging from slight discomfort or embarrassment, to mild annoyance, anger, and outright hostility (e.g., Andersson & Pearson, 1999; Pearson, Andersson, & Porath, 2000). The greater

the threat to face, the more intense the emotional response. Carson and Cupach (2000) report a strong linear relationship,  $r = .82$ , between the degree of face threat perceived by an individual and the level of anger he or she feels. In fact, some emotions may be uniquely connected to face threats. Keltner and colleagues (Keltner & Anderson, 2000; Keltner & Buswell, 1996, 1997; Keltner & Haidt, 1999) suggest that embarrassment is a distinct, functional emotion felt in response to a threat to social status, what we would call a face threat.

Goffman (1967) emphasized the negative affective reaction to a face threat, but he also described cognitive and behavioral responses to a face threat. A person whose face has been threatened may give the offender a chance to repair the damage, and if no repair (e.g., an apology) is forthcoming, has the options of unilaterally forgiving the offender, maintaining poise but holding a grudge, retaliating, or withdrawing from the interaction. In politeness theory, Brown and Levinson (1987) develop the hypothesis that a face threat directly affects the perceived relationship between the speaker and the hearer. For example, the intrinsic face threats enumerated by politeness theory, including disapproval, disagreement, challenge, and non-cooperation (Brown & Levinson, 1987, pp. 65–66), signal lack of regard for the receiver’s interests and are posited to convey a threat to the relationship between issuer and receiver. This hypothesized relationship between face threat and perceived threat to the relationship has been demonstrated empirically (Cupach & Carson, 2002), and is consistent with Goffman’s stance that “face maintenance is a condition of interaction, not its objective” (1967, p. 12).

Politeness theory (Brown & Levinson, 1987) discusses threats to two aspects of face. The first, *positive face*, is more closely associated with Goffman’s definition of face as the value of social image claimed by interactants, and with the construct of face that was used in previous experimental studies on face and bargaining. Threats to positive face include being embarrassed, criticized, disrespected, and the like. The second aspect, *negative face*, is more closely associated with an individual’s desire to be free from imposition. Both types of face could certainly be threatened during a negotiation, but positive face is more important for relationships (Cupach & Carson, 2002; Cupach & Messman, 1999), and therefore more likely to be linked to the success of integrative agreements.

### Face threats in negotiation

Many common negotiation tactics—disputing the value of an item, providing alternative anchors and frames, questioning interests and motives, criticizing arguments, and disregarding appeals—fall into the category of intrinsic threats to face, according to politeness theory (Brown & Levinson, 1987). Other practices, e.g., suggesting that the other party is inexperienced, has

miscalculated the value of a property, or has unrealistic expectations concerning the outcome, may be construed as face threats, especially if the hearer believes she or her has been personally implicated. It should be noted that many of the acts we call face threats are common competitive practices, and part of the “game” for some negotiators. Yet they are intrinsically threatening to face. A detailed discussion of how negotiators, or any social interactants, can redress intrinsic threats to face to compete without threatening the ongoing relationship is outside the scope of this paper, but Brown and Levinson (1987) provide a taxonomy of politeness strategies for accomplishing this in daily interaction.

Research suggests that the most egregious threats to an opponent’s face are counterproductive in a negotiation. Presenting a non-negotiable offer (“Here’s my offer, take it or leave it”) prompts a negotiator to become more competitive and less cooperative, leading to poorer outcomes (Tjosvold, 1977b) or no agreement at all (Raiffa, 1982, p. 48). The common strategy of criticizing your opponent’s position (or possessions), a direct threat to face according to Brown and Levinson (1987), can lead him or her to feel affronted and resist making concessions (Tjosvold & Huston, 1978). Despite the fact that face threats may result in hurt feelings and a threatened relationship, they can be used strategically—and not without risk—in a negotiation to apply pressure (e.g., Thompson, Nadler, & Kim, 1999) and/or to signal power (Brown & Levinson, 1987).

Face threats generate negative affect and threaten the relationship between the issuer and the receiver. A negotiator who receives a face threat, therefore, should have a negative emotional response (ranging from discomfort to hostility), and corresponding thoughts that the issuer has little regard for (a) the negotiator’s interests, and (b) maintaining a long-term, cooperative relationship with the negotiator. Both the affective and cognitive responses to a face threat should make a negotiator more competitive and less cooperative. There is evidence that negative affect causes negotiators to be less cooperative, more competitive, and less likely to make deals (Forgas, 1998), and more likely to engage in downward spirals of destructive behavior (Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, & Raia, 1997). A review of research on face threats in negotiation (Wilson, 1992) concluded, along these lines, that face threats ultimately result in competitive and/or hostile behavior that has a negative impact on negotiated outcomes.

In addition to an opponent’s direct threats to face, certain situational factors in a negotiation can constitute a threat to face, by heightening face concerns. One such factor is negotiating before an audience, such as the case of a negotiator who must act on behalf of a constituency (Friedman, 1994). Negotiators who are accountable to constituents show increased competitiveness (Carnevale, Pruitt, & Britton, 1979), although gender of the con-

stituent may moderate this effect (Pruitt, Carnevale, Forcey, & Van Slyck, 1986). Negotiators who are told that they appeared weak before an audience of their peers become even more competitive in later rounds of negotiation; they take the opportunity to retaliate against their opponent, even though it costs them in absolute tangible rewards (Brown, 1968).<sup>1</sup> High-profile CEOs who believe the whole world is watching them may become more competitive and less cooperative in business negotiations.

#### *Individual differences in face threat sensitivity*

The experimental research cited above provides strong causal support for the suggestion that face threat causes negotiators to become more competitive and less cooperative, thereby creating a roadblock to agreement and joint gain. In all of the negotiation studies discussed above, researchers manipulated the situation to create face threat without considering whether individuals may respond differently to face threats. Goffman suggested that some individuals could display “too much perceptiveness [to face threats] or too much pride, and [become] someone who is thin-skinned, who must be treated with kid gloves, requiring more care on the part of others than he may be worth to them” (1967, p. 40). Tynan (Oatway, 1997; Tynan, 1999) has proposed that individuals’ sensitivity, or reactivity, to face threats is a stable individual difference. We propose that exploring this individual difference in empirical studies can help us to leverage the power of face theory as a framework for understanding the impact of face threats on negotiation processes and outcomes.

We define face threat sensitivity (FTS) as the likelihood that an individual will have a negative affective reaction to a face threat. Pilot research suggests that FTS is a stable individual difference (Oatway, 1997). When one member of a dyad has high FTS, it affects the quality of the dyadic interaction via at least two channels. Individuals with high FTS are more likely to perceive others as untrustworthy and are less likely to communicate information, such as the admission of a mistake, that might be threatening to their own face (Tynan, 1999). At the same time, individuals with high FTS are less likely to be perceived by others as rational, and others are significantly less likely to communicate information about alternative points of view, raise disagreement, or point out errors to high FTS individuals even when that information would be helpful to the performance of a joint task and to the high FTS individual him- or herself (Oatway, 1997). Consequently, high FTS is associated not only with an individual’s own affect, perceptions, and communication

<sup>1</sup> Brown and Garland (Brown & Garland, 1971; Garland & Brown, 1972) also showed that people made the same trade-off between face and monetary gain when they had not been insulted.

behavior, but also with the way an individual is perceived and treated by his or her interaction partner.

#### *Individual differences interact with the situation*

Past attempts to link individual differences with negotiation outcomes generally have not been fruitful. Only when researchers follow Lewin's (1935) exhortation to take into account how the individual interacts with the situation is it possible to understand the nature of personality effects in negotiation. For example, Greenhalgh, Neslin, and Gilkey (1985) found that individual differences interact with negotiator aspirations to affect outcomes. Kray, Galinsky, and Thompson (2002) found that gender interacts with stereotypic expectations to affect outcomes. Barry and Friedman (1998) found that Extraversion (one of the "Big Five" personality dimensions) interacts with role to influence settlement price. Barry and Friedman found that dyads with extraverted buyers settled at higher prices than other dyads. Dyads with extraverted sellers did not settle significantly lower. Accordingly, individual differences in FTS must be understood as characteristics that interact with the situation rather than determine it (Mischel, 1968). In the present research, we examine how individual differences in FTS interact with the situation to affect negotiation outcomes. Because FTS is linked to face, and thus to identity, we hypothesize that face will interact with an aspect of the situation that is linked to identity.

#### *Identification with resources*

Theory and research on disputes suggest that when the outcome is bound to the identity of the negotiator, disputes become intractable, harder to resolve (Mandel, 1980; Smyth, 1994, 2002). In commerce, negotiating the value of resources with which one is identified, resources that are self-relevant, heightens face concerns. In a sense, we are what we own (James, 1890, p. 291); what we own becomes part of who we are (Abelson & Prentice, 1989), and this has an effect when we negotiate its value (Carnevale, 1995). This is not necessarily because owners value items more than buyers (i.e., the endowment effect, Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990; Thaler, 1980), but because owners include their possessions as part of their face. Because commercial negotiations typically consist of competing claims, challenges, and disagreements about the value of the goods or services being exchanged, we believe FTS should have a greater impact for a negotiator who is closely identified with those goods or services, who would naturally include them in his or her face.

#### *Face threats and the integrative and distributive elements of negotiation*

Face threat has been found to increase negotiator competitiveness and decrease negotiator cooperation.

Face threat should therefore have different effects on the distributive and integrative elements of negotiation (Walton & McKersie, 1965). The integrative element arises when negotiators have different strengths of preference across multiple issues; that is, Party A cares more about issue X and Party B cares more about issue Y. If both parties concede on the issue they care less about (i.e., trade-off or logroll), both parties can benefit in terms of their individual and joint outcomes. To do this, parties must have knowledge of each other's preferences (Thompson & Hastie, 1990). Integrative gain, therefore, depends on cooperation. A successful integrative negotiation outcome, defined as having high joint gain, is more likely if the parties trust one another and exchange information (Froman & Cohen, 1970; Kimmel, Pruitt, Magenau, Konar-Goldband, & Carnevale, 1980). Because the hypothesized effect of a face threat is to make a negotiator more competitive (Deutsch, 1961), and competitiveness reduces the likelihood that a negotiating dyad will trust one another and exchange information, we would expect to observe a negative impact of face threats and, by implication, high FTS, on the integrative component of negotiation outcomes (the size of the pie).

Most negotiations have a distributive element, meaning that the parties' preferences on an issue are in complete opposition; one party's gain must be another party's loss. Moreover, joint gain, once created through cooperation, must still be divided amongst the parties in what is essentially a competitive process (Lax & Sebenius, 1986). The negotiator's goal is generally to expand the pie and then to claim as large a share as possible of that pie. While high FTS could imperil integrative gain, it could potentially have a beneficial effect on the high FTS negotiator's distributive outcome, to the extent that increased competitiveness could lead to increased individual distributive outcomes (the relative size of one's slice).

Negotiators who have their face threatened adopt a more competitive and less cooperative stance toward their opponent, resulting in fewer agreements and less joint gain in the integrative elements of mixed-motive negotiations, and potentially greater gain in the distributive element of a mixed-motive negotiation, assuming the parties reach an agreement. In virtually all of these research investigations, face threats were experimentally manipulated. We conducted the present research to examine whether individual differences in FTS in *roles* that were most likely to activate face threat concerns would also lead to fewer agreements, and less joint gain.

#### **Study 1: Individual differences in face threat sensitivity**

Study 1 was conducted to assess both the reliability of Tynan's (1999) FTS measure and its convergent and divergent validity with constructs from a nascent

nomological network of individual differences that have been hypothesized and found to affect communication outcomes broadly, and negotiation outcomes in particular. Central to this network are perhaps the “Big Five” dimensions of personality, purported to subsume all personality traits (McCrae & John, 1992). The Neuroticism factor of the Big Five represents a dimension of expression of negative affect, which some personality theorists refer to as emotional stability (Goldberg, 1993). People who score high on Neuroticism tend to be anxious, moody, and highly emotional. Because FTS is defined as the likelihood an individual will respond to a face threat with negative affect, we expected FTS would share variance with Neuroticism. Neuroticism, like the other Big Five dimensions, is an end product of an enormous exercise in data reduction. Hence, it is a composite—a supervariable. The NEO measure of Neuroticism is intended to tap into an underlying dimension along which many specific personality traits are perceived by raters to co-occur. FTS is not conceptualized as an expression of anxiety, moodiness, or general emotionality, but of sensitivity to slights. An individual with high FTS does not necessarily have low self-esteem, chronic negative affect, or a feeling of hopelessness. Those traits are associated with Neuroticism, but they are not conceptually related to one’s reactivity to face threats.

With respect to a nomological network, FTS must be compared to other narrow personality traits that are manifested in interpersonal interaction and affect communication and negotiation outcomes. FTS as a construct is more social than other individual differences, in that it describes a tendency to react in a certain way to a specific set of social stimuli, rather than an innate state or a tendency to act. We compared FTS to three measures that could be considered similar on the dimensions of caring about one’s face and having high interpersonal reactivity. Machiavellianism (Christie & Geis, 1970) describes a dimension of self-orientation and exploitation of others. People who score high on Machiavellianism are willing to manipulate and deceive others to achieve their personal goals. High Machs tend to be more competitive in negotiations (Rubin & Brown, 1975, p. 189). Although research suggests that high FTS negotiators may also behave competitively in response to a face threat, we did not expect that, on their face, Machiavellianism and FTS would be correlated. An individual difference measure that is closely related to FTS on its face is self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974, 1987). Self-monitoring refers to the relative balance between internal cues (one’s own attitudes and beliefs) and external cues (the social situation) one draws on to construct one’s social face in a given situation. High self-monitors, who are sensitive to external cues, have been found to use a style of negotiating that is more effective at achieving integrative gain (Jordan & Roloff, 1997;

Trubisky, Ting-Toomey, & Lin, 1991). Because FTS is defined as the likelihood of a negative affective reaction to a face threat, and not as an increased sensitivity to detect face threats, we did not expect to find a significant correlation between FTS and self-monitoring. A third individual difference that is similar to FTS on the dimension of a negative affective reaction in an interpersonal situation is empathy. The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980, 1983) is a measure of empathy that has four subscales: perspective-taking, fantasy, empathetic concern, and personal distress. People who are empathetic have a negative affective reaction to other peoples’ difficulties. The difference between empathy and FTS is that empathy involves the ability to take the perspective of another person, in a sense, to feel “their” pain, whereas the pain felt in response to a face threat is one’s own. We therefore did not expect FTS to be correlated with empathy.

### Method

Two samples of graduate business students (Sample 1: 249 men and 186 women; Sample 2: 48 men and 62 women, 2 missing gender information) completed a measure of FTS, consisting of three items: *My feelings are hurt easily*, *I don’t respond well to direct criticism*, *I am pretty thin-skinned*. Participants circled a number from 1 to 9 to indicate whether the statement was *not at all characteristic* (1) or *very characteristic* (9) of them. A subset of 57 participants from Sample 1 also completed the NEO-FFI (Costa & McCrae, 1992), the IRI (Davis, 1980), and the Machiavellianism Scale (Christie & Geis, 1970), and a separate subset of 60 participants from Sample 1 completed the Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder, 1974). Participants from Sample 2 completed the FTS measure and the Neuroticism scale of the NEO-FFI (Costa & McCrae, 1992).

### Results

#### Reliability

The Cronbach’s  $\alpha$  for the FTS items was .75 in Sample 1 ( $N = 435$ ). The reliability of the FTS measure was thus sufficient to justify combining responses to all three items to form a single score. Means, standard deviations, and item intercorrelations are shown in Table 1.

Table 1  
FTS inter-item correlations

	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3
1. I don’t respond well to direct criticism	5.04	1.92			
2. My feelings get hurt easily	4.85	2.13	.41***		
3. I am pretty thin-skinned	4.57	2.11	.40***	.66***	

Note.  $N = 435$ .

\*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

Table 2  
Correlations between FTS and other measures

Scale	<i>r</i>
NEO-FFI	
Agreeableness	.19
Conscientiousness	-.21
Extraversion	-.26
Neuroticism	.46*
Openness	.08
IRI	
Personal distress	.48*
Empathetic concern	.12
Fantasy	.18
Perspective-taking	.03
Machiavellianism	+.13
Self-monitoring	+.19

\*  $p < .001$ .

### Convergent and divergent validity

Sixty participants also completed the Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder, 1974). Fifty-seven participants also completed the NEO-FFI (Costa & McCrae, 1992), the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980), and the Machiavellianism Scale (Christie & Geis, 1970). The correlations between FTS and these scales are shown in Table 2. FTS was not significantly correlated with self-monitoring, suggesting that these constructs are distinct. FTS was not significantly correlated with Machiavellianism, suggesting that these constructs are also distinct. FTS was not significantly correlated with the Fantasy, Empathetic Concern, or Perspective-Taking subscales of the IRI, suggesting that FTS is distinct from the overall construct of empathy. FTS was correlated  $r = .48$  with the personal distress subscale of the IRI. The personal distress subscale contains items that measure empathetic distress, e.g., *In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease*. As a component of empathy, it seems surprising that personal distress would be positively correlated with FTS. However, both constructs measure interpersonal reactivity along a negative affective dimension, so the positive correlation provides some convergent validity. Also, the mean correlation of FTS items with the items in the personal distress subscale,  $r_{\text{mean}} = .26$ , compared to the mean correlation of FTS items with one another,  $r_{\text{mean}} = .54$  ( $n = 59$ ), suggests that while these measures tap into a similar source variable, they also measure distinct constructs. A table of intercorrelations between the FTS items and the seven items from the personal distress subscale is found in Appendix A.

**Big Five.** Correlations between FTS and the scales of the NEO-FFI appear in Table 2. As predicted, FTS was correlated with Neuroticism ( $r = .46$ ). The positive correlation with FTS provides convergent validity that FTS is related to the expression of negative affect. Like

other traits associated with negative affect, FTS shares variance with Neuroticism. In addition, the items used to measure FTS in this study, e.g., *My feelings are hurt easily* are semantically similar to some of the items used to assess Neuroticism. While FTS is positively correlated with Neuroticism, it is not redundant with it. FTS tended to show a negative relationship with Conscientiousness and Extraversion, though neither correlation was significant in this sample.

**Confirmatory factor analysis.** Because of the significant correlation between the FTS measure and the Neuroticism factor, and because these constructs are closely related in a nomological network, it was important to establish that FTS is not merely a facet of Neuroticism, but represents a distinct, albeit related, construct. We collected data from a separate sample of  $n = 112$  graduate business students, who completed both the FTS measure and the Neuroticism scale from the NEO-FFI (Costa & McCrae, 1992). Participants' scores on the three-item FTS measure ranged from 4 to 27,  $M = 15.17$ ,  $SD = 5.24$ . The reliability of the FTS measure in this sample was .74. Scores on the 12-item Neuroticism scale ranged from 12 to 55,  $M = 32.41$ ,  $SD = 8.27$ . The  $\alpha$  was .88.

We conducted two confirmatory factor analyses, and compared the fit of the data to a two-factor (FTS, NEO) model, with the factors allowed to co-vary, with their fit to a one-factor model. We followed Anderson and Gerbing's (1988) recommendations for assessing the fit of the models. Factor loadings and fit statistics for both models appear in Table 3. The fit of the one-factor model was poor. The  $\chi^2$  was significant, at 220.35 ( $df = 90$ ),  $p < .001$ . The two-factor model fit the data significantly better than the one-factor model. Although the  $\chi^2$  was still large, at 166.81,  $df = 89$ ,  $p < .001$ , the difference between the  $\chi^2$  was significant, 53.43 ( $df = 1$ ),  $p < .001$ , providing confirmation that FTS is a narrow trait that shares a significant amount of variance with the supervariable Neuroticism, yet must be considered a distinct trait.

The critical information from the CFA was the validity of the FTS measure. An examination of the factor loadings (Table 3) reveals that all three FTS items loaded significantly onto one factor, while all 12 Neuroticism items loaded significantly onto the other factor. All standardized loadings for the FTS items were relatively large (.45 to .97). The factor loadings thus suggest convergent validity for the FTS measure. A complementary test of divergent validity described by Anderson and Gerbing (1988) is to assess whether the covariance between factors plus two times the standard error includes 1. The covariance between FTS and Neuroticism was .58, and the standard error was .08, so we can conclude that the factors are different, not equivalent, constructs.

Table 3  
Confirmatory factor analysis results of FTS and the NEO-FFI Neuroticism scale

Item	One-factor model		Two-factor model	
	Factor loading <sup>a</sup>	R <sup>2</sup>	Factor loading <sup>a</sup>	
			FTS	N
Don't take criticism well	.34	.11	.45	
Thin-skinned	.40	.16	.67	
Feelings easily hurt	.61	.38	.97	
N 1	.54	.30		.54
N 2	.65	.42		.63
N 3	.47	.22		.45
N 4	.66	.44		.68
N 5	.69	.48		.69
N 6	.64	.41		.64
N 7	.74	.55		.74
N 8	.41	.17		.43
N 9	.65	.43		.65
N 10	.67	.45		.70
N 11	.63	.40		.62
N 12	.57	.32		.57
$\chi^2$ <sup>b</sup> (df)	220.35 (90)		166.81 (89)	
NNFI	.73		.84	
RMSEA	.12		.09	
GFI	.77		.82	
CFI	.77		.86	
Covariance between factors	–		.58	

Note. FTS, face threat sensitivity; N, Neuroticism; CFI, comparative fit index; GFI, goodness of fit index; RMSEA, root mean square of approximation; NNFI, non-normed fit index.

<sup>a</sup>All factor loadings are significant at  $p < .001$ .

<sup>b</sup>The difference between the model  $\chi^2$ , 53.54,  $df = 1$ , is significant at  $p < .001$ .

The fit statistics for the two-factor model (Bentler's CFI = .86, Bentler & Bonett's NNFI = .84, RMSEA = .09) suggest that the two-factor model did not adequately fit the data. We were not discouraged, however, because previous attempts to use confirmatory factor analysis to fit items from the NEO-PI, one of the most widely used measures in personality research, have also resulted in poor fit (McCrae, Zonderman, Costa, & Bond, 1996; Schmit & Ryan, 1993). Church and Burke (1994) suggest that CFA models are unable to reveal a good fit of personality data to a model like the Big Five because the underlying structure of personality is not yet well specified. Scores on the NEO-FFI, like the FTS, provide a good indication that the underlying trait is more or less dominant, but they cannot be relied upon to differentiate between individuals whose scores are very similar.

### Discussion

The FTS items measure individual differences in the likelihood of a negative affective response to a face threat. The three items showed good construct validity. First, they appear to directly assess the likelihood of a negative affective reaction to a face threat. Second, they have adequate reliability, with a Cronbach's  $\alpha$  of .75 (.74

in Sample 2). Cortina (1993) suggests although convention is to accept an  $\alpha$  of  $> .70$  as adequate, "the level of reliability that is adequate depends on the decision that is made with the scale. The finer the distinction that needs to be made, the better the reliability must be" (p. 101). For the present purpose of assessing whether there is a predicted relationship between FTS and negotiation outcomes, we consider the  $\alpha$  acceptable.

FTS shares variance with other measures of negative affect and interpersonal reactivity, but is not redundant with them. FTS was correlated with Neuroticism and with the Personal Distress subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index, suggesting that it shares a common underlying connection to other measures of interpersonal negative affective reaction, but not so strongly (i.e., it accounts for less than 25% of the variance) that FTS would appear to be redundant with these constructs. FTS was not correlated with other forms of impression management, including self-monitoring and Machiavellianism, suggesting that it measures a distinct construct that is not so much a part of the presentation of face as it is the reaction to threats to face.

It might be argued that the correlation between FTS and Neuroticism raises the question of whether any outcome effects associated with FTS could be attributable directly to high levels of Neuroticism. As a predictor

of behavior in a competitive situation, Neuroticism has received little attention. No one, to our knowledge, has formulated a hypothesis linking Neuroticism to negotiation outcomes, although several researchers have measured Neuroticism in the context of negotiation or bargaining and have reported the results. Barry and Friedman (1998) measured Neuroticism along with the other Big Five dimensions, but found that it did not predict negotiation outcomes (see also O'Connor, Arnold, & Burris, 2003). Mack (1972) found that high levels of Neuroticism were weakly associated with lack of cooperation and failure to create joint gain in a bargaining game. More recently, Lynch and Evans (2002) found strong evidence that high levels of Neuroticism were associated with poor negotiation outcomes among defense attorneys. The reason Lynch and Evans found a link between Neuroticism and negotiation is probably because they asked raters to characterize colleagues they knew to be successful negotiators. This undoubtedly allowed raters to contextualize their assessments by thinking of how the target individuals behaved in a negotiation context. When Neuroticism is assessed in a broad context, it is less likely to predict specific behaviors. For this reason, FTS, which is a narrow, contextualized trait, should prove to be a better tool than Neuroticism for deconstructing the social interaction that describes a negotiation.

## Study 2: FTS and agreement rates

Face threats often result in competitive, if not hostile, behavior, and decrease the likelihood that negotiators will cooperate to realize the integrative potential of a deal (Wilson, 1992). In Study 2 we examined the relationship between FTS and negotiators' ability to reach agreements. Deutsch (1961) claims that all negotiations contain, in effect, multiple motives, in that on the one hand negotiators are trying to reach an advantageous agreement and on the other hand they are trying to maintain their own face or social image. When these goals conflict, apparently irrational behavior can result, such as walking away from a negotiation in which both parties would be more likely to meet their needs and satisfy their interests by reaching an agreement rather than reaching an impasse.

In Study 2, we chose a negotiation in which impasse is the likely result unless the buyer and seller can cooperate, exchange information, and create alternatives to reach a mutually satisfactory outcome. The seller in this negotiation not only owns the property that is the subject of the negotiation, but also has operated it as a sole proprietorship for 12 years and built its current reputation and clientele. The property can be thought of as a part of the seller's self (James, 1890), and the negotiated value of the settlement is thus a direct testament to the

seller's personal vision, efforts, abilities, and accomplishments. The buyer, in contrast, is not closely identified with the station or with the money he or she is offering in exchange for the station, but merely serving as a representative for a larger corporation. We predicted that dyads with a negotiator who has high FTS would be less likely to cooperate to realize the integrative potential of a deal, especially when the negotiator with high FTS is identified with the resources being negotiated. We therefore predicted that dyads with a high FTS seller would be less likely to reach agreement than other dyads.

## Method

### Participants

One hundred and forty-six students (86 men, 60 women) enrolled in a graduate negotiation course participated in a negotiation simulation.

### Materials

*Negotiation.* We used a two-party negotiation between a seller, the owner-operator of a service station and a buyer, the Vice President of Operations for a large oil company (Goldberg, 1997). The seller wishes to make enough money from the sale to fund a two-year sailing vacation around the world, with some money left over for living expenses when he/she returns, at least until she/he can find employment. The seller's best alternative to a negotiated settlement is an outstanding offer for \$400,000 from another oil company, but this is less than the \$580,000 the seller needs to fund his/her trip. The buyer wishes to purchase the station, and to secure managers to operate the station after purchase and a facility upgrade. The buyer's best alternative to a negotiated settlement is to build a new station nearby for an estimated cost of \$675,000. Initially, the minimum amount the seller is willing to accept, \$580,000, is higher than the maximum amount the buyer has been authorized by headquarters to pay, \$500,000. At first impression, therefore, the best outcome for both parties would be to declare an impasse. The underlying interests of the buyer and seller hold integrative potential, however, and if the negotiators discover the interests that underlie each others' positions and are willing to cooperate, then they can reach a mutually beneficial agreement and complete the sale.<sup>2</sup>

*Post-negotiation questionnaire.* Participants reported whether or not they reached an agreement, and their satisfaction with the outcome of the negotiation and the way they were treated by their negotiation partner on

<sup>2</sup> A common strategy for value creation in this exercise is for the buyer to offer the seller a job when she/he returns from the vacation.

7-point scales (1 = not at all satisfied, 7 = extremely satisfied).

*Procedure*

Participants had completed the FTS measure described in Study 1 in a previous session. Participants were randomly assigned to either the buyer or seller role, and randomly assigned to dyads. They were given confidential role materials, detailing the information for their respective role, and instructions for the exercise. Dyads had 45 min to complete the negotiation.

*Results*

*FTS*

The three items of the FTS had an  $\alpha$  of .72. They were summed to obtain an individual score for FTS, ranging from 4 to 27,  $M = 14.13$ ,  $SD = 4.97$ . A check confirmed that buyers' FTS scores ( $M = 14.59$ ,  $SD = 5.08$ ) and sellers' FTS scores ( $M = 13.67$ ,  $SD = 4.85$ ) did not differ,  $t(72) = 1.03$ ,  $p = .31$ .

*Agreement rates*

Overall, 43 (59%) of the dyads reached an agreement in the negotiation. The remaining 30 dyads declared impasse. Seller's FTS and buyer's FTS were entered in a logistic regression, along with the Seller's FTS  $\times$  Buyer's FTS interaction (measures of FTS were centered). The results were not significant for the effects associated with seller's FTS, Wald (1) = 0.83,  $p = .36$ , with buyer's FTS, Wald (1) = .19,  $p = .66$ , or with the interaction, Wald (1) = .04,  $p = .84$ . Though we had not predicted an effect for buyer's FTS, or for the interaction, we had expected an effect associated with seller's FTS on outcomes.

Upon examining the distribution of dyads with high FTS sellers that reached agreement (Fig. 1), we determined that the pattern of results among dyads with high FTS sellers appeared to conform to our predictions. Dyads with high or extreme FTS Sellers ("high" is conventionally defined as the top third of the distribution; "extreme" is conventionally defined as values that exceed the mean plus .5  $SD$ , see, e.g., Barry & Friedman, 1998; Barry & Stewart, 1997) had relatively more impasses than other dyads. To test whether that difference was significant, we split the sample of dyads into those with ( $n = 22$ ) and without ( $n = 51$ ) a high FTS seller, and those with ( $n = 24$ ) and without ( $n = 49$ ) a high FTS buyer. A check of the observed versus expected cell sizes in this  $2 \times 2$ , however, revealed that random assignment resulted in a significantly uneven distribution of dyads,  $\chi^2(1, N = 73) = 11.45$ ,  $p = .001$ . Only one dyad had both a high FTS buyer and a high FTS seller, which rendered a conventional  $2$  (buyer's FTS)  $\times$   $2$  (seller's FTS) ANOVA impractical. Consequently, we analyzed results separately for the independent variables of buyer and seller FTS.

Post hoc tests inflate the risk of a Type I error. The researcher does not want to capitalize on chance when testing the significance of an unplanned effect. In this case, however, we felt justified comparing dyads with high FTS sellers to other dyads because this comparison directly tested our a priori hypothesis, albeit with a more liberal test (not assuming a linear relationship). We adjusted the  $\alpha$  level for the post hoc test, following the Bonferroni procedure of dividing an  $\alpha$  by the implicit number of post hoc comparisons. In this case, we could have tested the differences between groups using a median split, a top-third split, or a bottom-third split.




Fig. 1. Negotiation outcomes by seller's FTS, Study 2.

Table 4  
Agreement rates and sales prices for high FTS negotiators

<i>Seller</i>		
Agreement rate	69%	36%
<i>n</i> (with agreement)	51 (35)	22 (8)
Sales price		
<i>M</i>	464	471
<i>SD</i>	42	32
<i>Buyer</i>		
Agreement rate	55%	67%
<i>n</i> (with agreement)	49 (27)	24 (16)
Sales price		
<i>M</i>	460	475
<i>SD</i>	44	32

Note. Sales prices in \$1000.

We divided .05 by three, and set .017 as the  $\alpha$  for the test comparing dyads with a high FTS seller to other dyads.

Dyads with a high FTS seller were less likely to reach agreement (36% agreement rate) than dyads with a non-FTS seller (69% agreement rate),  $\chi^2(1, N = 73) = 6.61$ ,  $p = .01$ .<sup>3</sup> Dyads with a high FTS buyer, on the other hand, did not significantly differ in their likelihood to reach agreement,  $\chi^2(1, N = 73) = 0.89$ ,  $p = .35$ . Counts are in Table 4.

#### Distributive gain

If high FTS negotiators are more competitive, we might expect that they would negotiate more favorable prices when they were able to reach a deal. We therefore compared the station sales price (expressed in thousands of dollars) of high FTS and non-FTS negotiators, among dyads that reached agreements. Means and standard deviations are in Table 4. Seller FTS did not affect sales price,  $t(41) = 0.43$ ,  $p = .67$ . Similarly, buyer FTS did not affect sales price,  $t(41) = 1.22$ ,  $p = .23$ .

#### Negotiator satisfaction

We assumed that negotiators would, all things considered, prefer to reach an agreement, and that they would believe a that reaching an agreement was more desirable than declaring an impasse. To confirm this assumption we analyzed satisfaction at the level of the dyad with two MANOVAs, one for buyers' and sellers' satisfaction with terms of the agreement and one for buyers' and sellers' satisfaction with treatment by negotiation partner. (Some negotiators did not complete

both items, resulting in different cell sizes for different measures.) Reaching an agreement was significantly related to satisfaction with terms,  $F(2, 59) = 19.29$ ,  $p < .001$ . Sellers who reached agreement were more satisfied ( $M = 3.73$ ,  $SD = 1.52$ ) than sellers who declared impasse ( $M = 2.14$ ,  $SD = 1.6$ ),  $F(1, 60) = 14.55$ ,  $p < .001$ . Buyers who reached agreement were also more satisfied ( $M = 4.12$ ,  $SD = 1.48$ ) than buyers who declared impasse ( $M = 2.23$ ,  $SD = 1.22$ ),  $F(1, 60) = 26.46$ ,  $p < .001$ . Reaching an agreement had a marginal relationship to satisfaction with treatment,  $F(2, 68) = 2.54$ ,  $p = .09$ . Sellers who reached agreement were more satisfied with the way they were treated ( $M = 5.05$ ,  $SD = 1.41$ ) than sellers who declared impasse ( $M = 4.21$ ,  $SD = 1.71$ ),  $F(1, 69) = 4.98$ ,  $p = .03$ . Reaching agreement had no relationship to buyers' satisfaction with treatment; buyers who reached agreement ( $M = 4.86$ ,  $SD = 1.34$ ) were not significantly more satisfied than buyers who declared impasse ( $M = 4.50$ ,  $SD = 1.62$ ),  $F(1, 69) = 1.04$ ,  $p = .31$ . In sum, both buyers and sellers were more satisfied with the negotiation when they reached an agreement, but only sellers were also more satisfied with the way they were treated when they were able to reach agreement.

#### Discussion

Dyads with a high FTS seller were nearly twice as likely to declare impasse when an agreement would have been in both parties' interests. Our assumption that both parties desired an agreement was confirmed by the fact that both buyers and sellers who reached agreement were more satisfied with their negotiation outcome than those who declared impasse. We did not find any reliable pattern for high FTS buyers. We did not observe any reliable effect associated with negotiator FTS on distributive gain, measured by sales price. We are hesitant to draw any conclusions about FTS and distributive gain, however, because of the possibility that the bargaining zone in the exercise we used was too small to observe any reliable differences.

Our results suggest that high FTS, defined as having an FTS score in the top third of the distribution, leads to less cooperative outcomes. However, our initial analysis, regressing outcomes on the original FTS scores, was not significant. There could be two explanations for this. First, the true relationship may be non-monotonic. The distribution illustrated in Fig. 1 suggests a curvilinear relationship between FTS and impasse rates—the lowest impasse rates appear to be in dyads with an average FTS seller, rather than a low FTS seller. Alternatively, FTS may be similar to other narrow personality traits such as Machiavellianism (Christie & Geis, 1970) that are expressed as two categorical types, though they are measured on ordinal scales. High self-monitors are, for example, categorically different from low self-monitors.

<sup>3</sup> We also conducted a 2 (seller's FTS)  $\times$  2 (seller's gender)  $\times$  2 (agreement) Hierarchical Loglinear analysis. As with the two-way analysis, there was a significant effect for Seller FTS, with high FTS sellers less likely to reach agreement, partial  $\chi^2(1, N = 73) = 6.66$ ,  $p = .01$ . The Seller's Gender  $\times$  Agreement interaction was not significant, partial  $\chi^2(1, N = 73) = 0.07$ ,  $p = .79$ , nor was the Seller's Gender  $\times$  FTS  $\times$  Agreement interaction,  $\chi^2(1, N = 73) = 0.25$ ,  $p = .62$ , suggesting that seller's gender did not directly affect or interact with seller's FTS to affect agreement rate.

High self-monitors “monitor or control the images of self they project in social interaction to a great extent,” while low self-monitors “value congruence between who they are and what they do” (Snyder, 1987, p. 5). In cases such as these, a midrange score on an ordinal scale may represent a neutral position between two extremes. Thus, individuals with high FTS may be thin-skinned and sensitive compared to individuals with a midrange score, but individuals with low FTS may be categorically different in ways we have yet to fully understand. While face theory predicts poor outcomes for those with high FTS, it does not predict outcomes for those with low FTS. It should be noted that the cut-off point for an FTS score to be considered “high” in this sample was  $x > 16$ . Since the scale midpoint is 15 (the lowest possible score is 3 and the highest possible score is 27), another way to view this categorization is that those categorized as “high” are those who reported that the FTS items were, on average, characteristic of them. Thus, when we compared high FTS negotiators to other negotiators, we were comparing negotiators who characterize themselves as thin-skinned, easily hurt, and not able to take direct criticism well, to other negotiators. We interpret our results, therefore, as supporting the prediction derived from past theory and research.

Consistent with Lewin’s (1935) exhortation to look for the way personality interacts with the situation, and with previous research that successfully found effects associated with individual differences in negotiation (e.g., Barry & Friedman, 1998; Greenhalgh et al., 1985; Kray et al., 2002) we found that role assignment created a situation in which high FTS predicted negotiation outcomes. The role of the seller in this negotiation was closely identified with the value of the property that was the subject of the negotiation, and therefore was the negotiator most likely to include the resources being negotiated in his or her face. In support of this interpretation, we note that sellers, and not buyers, were more satisfied with the way they were treated when they were able to reach an agreement than when they declared an impasse. We should note that it is possible to conceive of a negotiation in which the buyer, not the seller, is closely identified with the value of the negotiation: Imagine a buyer trying to acquire a family heirloom that had passed to an owner with no attachment to the item. In such a case, we would hypothesize that the buyer’s FTS, and not the seller’s, would play a role in the negotiation outcome.

Study 2 provides a conceptual replication of the early studies on face and negotiation (Brown, 1968; Deutsch, 1961). Rather than operationalize face threat as an experimenter-controlled variable, we allowed it to vary as a product of the interaction between a situational variable, role, and an individual difference, FTS. We observed the same pattern of results: face threat reduced the likelihood of agreement. Study 2 thus extends the

application of face theory in negotiation to include FTS and role.

### Study 3: FTS and integrative gain

Study 2 found a significant effect associated with high FTS on negotiation outcomes, namely that dyads with a high FTS seller were less likely to reach agreement. We believe this is because face threat prompts negotiators to adopt more competitive and less cooperative behaviors. Thus the combination of face threats and high FTS should create a roadblock to integrative agreements and joint gain. Even when dyads with high FTS negotiators reach an agreement, this roadblock should slow them down, reducing the overall value of the agreement, the joint gain that the parties could otherwise create by cooperating and making trade-offs.

The bargaining zone in Study 2 was initially negative, and negotiators had to cooperate to create a positive bargaining zone. The exercise we used in Study 3, in contrast, has a large positive bargaining zone, and minimal cooperation is required to reach an agreement that will satisfy the minimum requirements of both parties. If the parties cooperate and make trade-offs, however, they can increase the bargaining zone even further, creating larger payoffs for at least one if not both parties. In Study 3, we used a scorable contract negotiation between a job candidate and a corporate recruiter. This allowed us to differentiate between integrative and distributive gain. We also increased the number of dyads to be able to examine how one negotiator’s FTS interacts with his or her opponent’s FTS. And we measured a potential mediating variable, competitiveness, as well as other alternative explanations of likeability and rationality. In this negotiation, the subject of the negotiation was the value of the candidate’s services to the company. The candidate owns and is highly identified with the services and talents he or she will provide. The recruiter, in contrast, represents the interests of a large corporation. We therefore predicted that dyads with a high FTS candidate would have lower joint gain than other dyads.

#### *Method*

##### *Participants*

Two hundred and fourteen graduate business students (133 men, 81 women) participated in a mixed-motive negotiations exercise.

##### *Materials*

*Negotiation exercise.* We used a two-party mixed-motive, scorable negotiation of an employment contract

between a job candidate and a corporate recruiter (Neale, 1997). The parties negotiated eight issues: salary, start date, bonus, vacation, moving expenses, insurance benefits, job location, and job assignment. Each of the eight issues had five predetermined alternatives, e.g., five possible salary levels or five potential start dates. The candidate and recruiter had to agree to a contract that included one alternative for each of the eight issues. Each alternative had a specific “payoff” or value to the candidate, and a specific payoff to the recruiter. Four of the issues were integrative, two were distributive, and two were compatible. To maximize the integrative or joint gain, dyads had to communicate preferences, and use trade-offs and logrolling. If the parties simply split the difference on all issues without creating joint gain, the resulting agreement was worth 48 points to each of them, for a dyad total of 96 (points are in 100s). If they maximized the integrative potential of the contract, they could increase the dyad’s total sum to 132. Both parties’ best alternative to a negotiated settlement was no agreement, an outcome that was worth 0 points to each of them.

*Post-negotiation questionnaire.* Participants reported the degree to which they and their negotiation partner each displayed the following demeanors during the negotiation: *competitive, cooperative, pleasant, likable, rational, and demanding*, on scales from 1 (*not at all*) to 5 (*extremely*). People are quite accurate at judging interpersonal behavior from short interactions, particularly behaviors that are affective, or particularly relevant to the situation (Ambady & Rosenthal, 1992). We chose these demeanors to describe the relational quality of the negotiation, using dimensions that were easily understood and evaluated by our participants. We included *competitive* to test Deutsch’s prediction that competitiveness mediated the effect of face threats on negotiation outcomes.

Candidates also indicated whether they thought they would be friends with the recruiter, and how long they would stay in the job they just agreed to take. All participants rated dyadic rapport and the degree of respect the recruiter showed the candidate.

### Procedure

Participants completed the FTS measure described in Study 1 in an earlier session. Participants were randomly assigned to either the role of candidate or recruiter, and given confidential role materials to prepare for the negotiation. Candidates and recruiters were randomly assigned to dyads. Dyads were given 30 min to negotiate. Upon concluding the negotiation, both members of the dyad completed a contract showing which alternatives had been agreed upon for each of the eight issues. Each participant then completed an individual post-negotiation questionnaire.

## Results

### FTS

The three items of the FTS had an  $\alpha$  level of .71. They were summed to obtain an individual score for threat sensitivity, ranging from 5 to 27,  $M = 14.67$ ,  $SD = 4.94$ . A check confirmed that recruiters’ FTS scores ( $M = 14.60$ ,  $SD = 5.12$ ) and candidates’ FTS scores ( $M = 14.10$ ,  $SD = 4.89$ ) did not differ,  $t(106) = 0.69$ ,  $p = .49$ . Participants were categorized as high FTS if their score fell into the top third of the distribution (scores above 16). Dyads were then categorized according to whether they contained a high FTS candidate and/or a high FTS recruiter.

Nine dyads were unable to reach an agreement in the allotted time. Of these, four had no high FTS negotiator, three had a high FTS recruiter, and two had a high FTS candidate. We ran a 2 (candidate FTS)  $\times$  2 (recruiter FTS)  $\times$  2 (agreement) Hierarchical Loglinear analysis to determine whether there was any association between negotiator FTS and agreement rate. The Candidate FTS  $\times$  Agreement association,  $\chi^2(1, N = 107) = 0.28$ ,  $p = .60$ , and the Recruiter FTS  $\times$  Agreement association,  $\chi^2(1, N = 107) = 0.001$ ,  $p = .97$ , suggest no association between negotiator FTS and a dyad’s ability to reach agreement. On the independent variable of negotiator FTS, then, the dyads that failed to reach agreement did not differ from the rest of the sample. We assume their impasses were due to a failure to understand or follow instructions, and because their scores on the dependent variable for integrative gain (0) were more than three standard deviations from the sample mean, and their scores on the dependent measure of distributive gain (share to candidate) were impossible to compute, they were treated as statistical outliers in the dependent measures and excluded from further analysis.<sup>4</sup> This left 98 dyads categorized into the following four cells: 43 dyads with no high FTS negotiator,

<sup>4</sup> It may trouble some readers that we interpret impasses as a failure to create integrative gain in Study 2 and as a failure to follow instructions in Study 3. The rationale for our interpretation stems from the different structures of the exercises we used to test negotiators’ ability to create integrative gain. The parties’ payoff or point schedules in Study 3 are structured to create a positive bargaining zone that permits the parties to reach an agreement without making tradeoffs and creating integrative gain. It is therefore possible in Study 3 to distinguish between a dyad’s ability to create integrative gain and a dyad’s ability to reach an agreement, a distinction we were not able to make in Study 2. To test whether the impasses in Study 3 represented an extreme effect of negotiator FTS, we assigned an integrative point score of zero to the nine dyads that reached impasse, and included them in an ANOVA of candidate FTS and recruiter FTS. To deal with the presence of extreme values, we first transformed the integrative points to ranks. The results were similar to those obtained with 98 dyads (Table 6), but with a smaller, non-significant effect of candidate’s FTS,  $F(1, 103) = 2.44$ ,  $p = .12$ . This supports our interpretation that the impasses in Study 3 were of idiosyncratic origin, unrelated to FTS.

Table 5  
Integrative and distributive gain in a scorable contract negotiation for high FTS negotiators

Recruiter	Non-FTS candidate		High FTS candidate	
	Non-FTS	High FTS	Non-FTS	High FTS
Dyad integrative points				
<i>M</i>	134 <sub>a,b</sub>	135 <sub>a</sub>	128 <sub>b</sub>	129 <sub>a,b</sub>
<i>SD</i>	11	8	12	13
Candidate total points				
<i>M</i>	653 <sub>a</sub>	644 <sub>a,b</sub>	527 <sub>b</sub>	697 <sub>a</sub>
<i>SD</i>	18	18	26	18
Recruiter total points				
<i>M</i>	556 <sub>a,b</sub>	585 <sub>a,b</sub>	636 <sub>a</sub>	475 <sub>b</sub>
<i>SD</i>	20	18	23	20
Candidate share of total points				
<i>M</i>	54% <sub>a</sub>	52% <sub>a,b</sub>	45% <sub>b</sub>	60% <sub>a</sub>
<i>SD</i>	16%	14%	22%	16%

Note. Points are divided by 100. Means in the same row that do not share subscripts differ at  $p < .05$  in the Tukey honestly significant difference comparison.

19 dyads with a high FTS candidate but not a high FTS recruiter, 25 dyads with a high FTS recruiter but not a high FTS candidate, and 11 dyads with both a high FTS candidate and a high FTS recruiter. A check of observed versus expected cell sizes showed no significant differences,  $\chi^2(1, N = 98) = 0, p = .99$ . The harmonic cell size was  $n_h = 19.34$ . Results were analyzed at the dyadic level with a 2 (candidate's FTS)  $\times$  2 (recruiter's FTS) factorial.

#### Scored outcomes

Each dyad completed an employment contract agreeing to certain alternatives for the eight issues in the negotiation (bonus, vacation, start date, moving expenses, insurance, job assignment, job location, and salary). The candidate's and recruiter's respective payoff schedules were used to calculate the number of points earned by each member of the dyad on each issue, and then those points were combined to obtain candidate, recruiter, and dyad scores for compatible, integrative, and distributive issues. We analyzed the effect associated with candidate and recruiter FTS on the points earned on compatible and integrative issues (the dyad score for distributive issues was fixed), and on the allocation of

points within the dyad (share to candidate, share to recruiter), using separate ANOVAs. Means for all four cells for the analyses described below appear in Table 5.

*Integrative gain.* The most integrative points a dyad could earn in this negotiation were 144 (points are expressed in 100s). There was a main effect associated with candidate's FTS,  $F(1, 94) = 5.58, p = .02$ , as predicted (Table 6).<sup>5</sup> Dyads with a high FTS candidate earned fewer points on integrative issues than other dyads. No effects were observed for high FTS recruiter or for the interaction of high FTS candidate and high FTS recruiter on integrative gain ( $ps > .50$ ). We also conducted a test of the effect associated with candidate's and recruiter's original FTS scores entering both variables (centered), along with the Candidate's FTS  $\times$  Recruiter's FTS interaction, in the GLM module of SPSS. The results were not significant for the effects associated with candidate's FTS score,  $F(1, 94) = 0.95, p = .33$ , recruiter's FTS score,  $F(1, 94) = 0.15, p = .70$ , or the interaction,  $F(1, 94) = 0.28, p = .60$ . FTS also did not predict points earned on compatible issues. Across the entire sample, 95 of 98 dyads earned the maximum

Table 6  
Analysis of variance for dyad integrative gain

Source	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Candidate FTS (C)	1	5.58*	.02
Recruiter FTS (R)	1	0.16	.69
C $\times$ R	1	0.00	.98
<i>D</i> within-group error	94	(11605)	

Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square error, in hundreds of points. *D* = dyads.

\*  $p < .05$ .

<sup>5</sup> We also conducted a 2 (candidate gender)  $\times$  2 (recruiter gender) ANOVA on dyad integrative points. There were no significant effects of candidate's gender,  $F(1, 94) = 0.56, p = .46$ , recruiter's gender,  $F(1, 94) = 1.75, p = .19$ , or Candidate's Gender  $\times$  Recruiter's Gender interaction,  $F(1, 94) = 1.62, p = .21$ . We saved the residuals of this ANOVA as dyad integrative gain with effects of gender partialled out. A 2 (candidate FTS)  $\times$  2 (recruiter FTS) ANOVA on these residuals found a main effect associated with candidate FTS,  $F(1, 94) = 5.16, p = .03, r = .23$ , with high FTS candidates getting less integrative gain than other candidates. There were no significant effects of recruiter's FTS,  $F(1, 94) = 0.31, p = .58$ , or Candidate FTS  $\times$  Recruiter FTS interaction,  $F(1, 94) = 0.01, p = .94$ , on these residuals, suggesting that negotiator gender did not account for our results.

24 points on the two compatible issues, resulting in little variance on this variable.

*Distributive gain.* We measured distributive gain by calculating the share of the total dyad points captured by each negotiator, expressed as candidate's share of the pie. There was no main effect associated with candidate FTS on candidate's share,  $F(1, 94) < 1.00$  (Table 7). A marginal main effect associated with recruiter FTS on candidate's share,  $F(1, 94) = 3.05, p = .08$ , was qualified by a Candidate's FTS  $\times$  Recruiter's FTS interaction,  $F(1, 94) = 4.91, p = .03$ .<sup>6</sup> A post hoc test revealed that high FTS candidates who were paired with non-FTS recruiters got significantly smaller shares than either high FTS candidates who were paired with high FTS recruiters, or non-FTS candidates who were paired with non-FTS recruiters.

We conducted post hoc tests on candidate's total points, independent of recruiter's points, and on recruiter's total points, independent of candidate's points, to determine which negotiators were actually getting better outcomes. These tests and the negotiators' point totals appear in Table 5. It seemed that in dyads with a non-FTS candidate, recruiter FTS had no impact and opponents earned more joint gain and split the pie more or less evenly. In dyads with a high FTS candidate, however, recruiter FTS did have an impact, resulting in a skewed split: more points to the recruiter, when he or she was not FTS, and more to the candidate, when the recruiter was high FTS.

*Negotiators' ratings of self and opponent*

After completing their agreement form, negotiators rated themselves and their opponents on six aspects of demeanor: competitive, cooperative, rational, pleasant, demanding, and likable. We analyzed these ratings with four 2 (candidate's FTS)  $\times$  2 (recruiter's FTS) MANOVAs, on (1) candidates' self-ratings (Table 8); (2) candidates' ratings of recruiter; (3) recruiter's self-ratings; and (4) recruiter's ratings of candidate. (Data were missing for three recruiters and five candidates; we included their partners' responses, resulting in unequal *df*.) High FTS candidates described themselves as more

Table 7  
Analysis of variance for candidate's share of dyad's total points

Source	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Candidate FTS (C)	1	0.09	.77
Recruiter FTS (R)	1	3.05	.08
C $\times$ R	1	4.91*	.03
<i>D</i> within-group error	94	(.03)	

Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square error, in share of total. *D* = dyads.

\*  $p < .05$ .

Table 8  
Multivariate analysis of variance for candidate's self-appraisal

Source	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
<i>Between subjects</i>			
Candidate FTS (C)	6	1.77	.12
Recruiter FTS (R)	6	0.72	.63
C $\times$ R	6	0.90	.50
<i>Within subjects</i>			
Candidate FTS (C)			
Likable	1	0.12	.73
Competitive	1	8.55*	.00
Pleasant	1	0.41	.52
Rational	1	0.15	.70
Cooperative	1	0.27	.60
Demanding	1	0.27	.61
Recruiter FTS (R)			
Likable	1	1.03	.31
Competitive	1	0.56	.46
Pleasant	1	0.27	.61
Rational	1	0.10	.75
Cooperative	1	0.00	.95
Demanding	1	0.34	.56
C $\times$ R			
Likable	1	0.29	.59
Competitive	1	0.60	.44
Pleasant	1	0.10	.75
Rational	1	0.45	.51
Cooperative	1	1.35	.25
Demanding	1	0.77	.38

Note. *D* = dyads.

\*  $p < .01$ .

competitive ( $M = 3.66, SD = 0.17$ ) than other candidates ( $M = 3.05, SD = 0.12$ ),  $F(1, 89) = 8.55, p = .004$ . High FTS recruiters described themselves as less demanding ( $M = 2.70, SD = 0.15$ ) than other recruiters ( $M = 3.10, SD = 0.12$ ),  $F(1, 91) = 4.13, p = .045$ . An interaction between candidate's and recruiter's FTS predicted candidates' rating of recruiter's cooperativeness,  $F(1, 88) = 6.17, p = .02$ . Non-FTS candidates described high FTS recruiters as less cooperative ( $M = 3.74, SD = 0.18$ ) than other recruiters ( $M = 4.10, SD = 0.14$ ), while high FTS candidates described high FTS recruiters as more cooperative ( $M = 4.09, SD = .26$ ) than other recruiters ( $M = 3.44, SD = 0.21$ ). None of the other demeanor ratings were reliably

<sup>6</sup> We also conducted a 2 (candidate gender)  $\times$  2 (recruiter gender) ANOVA on candidate's share of dyad total points. There were no significant effects of candidate's gender,  $F(1, 94) = 2.75, p = .10$ , recruiter's gender,  $F(1, 94) = 0.59, p = .45$ , or Candidate's Gender  $\times$  Recruiter's Gender interaction,  $F(1, 94) = 0.15, p = .70$ . We saved the residuals of this ANOVA as candidate's share with effects of gender partialled out. A 2 (candidate FTS)  $\times$  2 (recruiter FTS) ANOVA on these residuals found no significant effect associated with candidate FTS,  $F(1, 94) = 0.03, p = .87$ , a trend for recruiter FTS,  $F(1, 94) = 3.63, p = .06$ , once again qualified by a Candidate FTS  $\times$  Recruiter FTS interaction,  $F(1, 94) = 4.08, p = .05$ , with high FTS candidates paired with a non-FTS recruiter obtaining the smallest share of dyad integrative points.

predicted by candidate's FTS, recruiter's FTS, or the interaction.

At the time participants made these ratings, they knew their own point total, though not their opponent's point total. To eliminate the concern that negotiator ratings of self and other were influenced by actual outcomes, we ran the same multivariate analyses with the participant's own point total as a covariate. Candidate's point total did not significantly predict candidate's self-ratings within the multivariate model,  $F(6, 83) = 1.85$ ,  $p = .10$ , and the main effect associated with candidate's FTS on self-ratings of competitiveness was still significant,  $F(1, 87) = 9.33$ ,  $p = .003$ . Candidate's point total did in fact predict candidate's ratings of the recruiter's behavior within the multivariate model,  $F(6, 82) = 3.46$ ,  $p = .004$ . The observed candidate's FTS by recruiter's FTS interaction on candidate's ratings of recruiter's cooperativeness was still marginally significant,  $F(1, 87) = 3.84$ ,  $p < .06$ . Recruiter's point total did not significantly predict recruiter's self-ratings,  $F(1, 90) = 1.49$ ,  $p = .19$ , but adding it to the model reduced the significance of the main effect associated with recruiter's FTS on self-ratings of demandingness to  $p = .09$ .

#### *Competitiveness mediates relationship between FTS and integrative outcome*

Deutsch (1961) argued that the need to save face in a bargaining situation makes negotiators more competitive, and that a competitive orientation leads to lower joint gain. We tested whether competitiveness mediated the relationship between candidate's FTS and the dyad's joint gain. To establish mediation, it is necessary to show that (a) candidates' competitiveness predicts joint gain while controlling for their level of FTS, and (b) the

relationship between candidate's level of FTS and dyad's joint gain is significantly reduced when controlling for the candidate's competitiveness (Baron & Kenny, 1986). When both candidate's competitiveness and their level of FTS were simultaneously entered into a regression equation, competitiveness continued to predict joint gain,  $\chi = -.22$ ,  $(91) = -2.09$ ,  $p = .04$ , but the effect associated with FTS was reduced from  $\chi = -.23$  to  $\chi = -.17$ ,  $t(91) = -1.60$ ,  $p = .11$ . We then tested whether this reduction was significant, following Kenny, Kashy, and Bolger (1998), and it was,  $Z = -1.63$ ,  $p = .049$ , one-tailed. The relationship between candidates' level of FTS and their dyad's joint gain was partially mediated by their competitiveness during the negotiation. High FTS candidates were more competitive, resulting in lower joint gain.

#### *Respect and rapport*

Candidates and recruiters rated the dyad's rapport and the level of respect shown by the recruiter to the candidate. Candidates' ratings and recruiters' ratings were analyzed with 2 (candidate's FTS)  $\times$  2 (recruiter's FTS) MANOVAs. Recruiters said they showed less respect to a high FTS candidate ( $M = 3.36$ ,  $SD = .18$ ) than to other candidates ( $M = 3.83$ ,  $SD = .12$ ),  $F(1, 90) = 4.88$ ,  $p = .03$ . This effect remained significant at  $p = .03$  after recruiter's point total was added to the model as a covariate. No effects of FTS were observed on candidate's ratings of dyad rapport or respect.

*Did recruiters notice candidates' competitiveness?* High FTS candidates described their behavior as more competitive. Did recruiters agree with that assessment? Table 9 gives the partial correlations between candidate's

Table 9  
Partial correlations between candidate and recruiter demeanor ratings, controlling for candidate's and recruiter's point totals

	Competitive	Cooperative	Demanding	Likable	Pleasant	Rational
<i>Recruiter's ratings of candidate</i>						
Candidate's ratings of self						
Competitive	.14	-.35***	.15	-.20	-.25*	-.08
Cooperative	-.32**	.51***	-.17	.36***	.37***	.25*
Demanding	.16	-.45***	.16	-.34***	-.22*	-.26*
Likable	-.34***	.51***	-.32**	.24*	.24*	.20
Pleasant	-.27*	.42***	-.15	.35***	.32**	.20
Rational	-.19*	.28**	-.19	.26*	.15	.14
<i>Candidate's ratings of recruiter</i>						
Recruiter's ratings of self						
Competitive	.00	-.14	.05	.02	-.04	-.16
Cooperative	-.19	.17	-.23*	.23*	.18	.14
Demanding	-.05	-.14	.16	-.24*	-.17	-.17
Likable	-.14	.28**	-.15	.07	.27*	.21
Pleasant	-.01	.23*	-.04	.25*	.22*	.21*
Rational	-.04	.07	-.06	.15	.04	.17

\*  $p < .05$ .

\*\*  $p < .01$ .

\*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

and recruiter's ratings of their own and their partner's demeanor, controlling for both candidate's point total and recruiter's point total. Candidate's self-described competitiveness was negatively correlated with recruiter's descriptions of candidate's cooperativeness,  $r = -.35$ , and pleasantness,  $r = -.25$ . There was, in fact, more agreement between the parties' descriptions of the candidate's behavior than their descriptions of the recruiter's behavior. Of all the demeanor ratings, candidate's self-descriptions seemed to best predict recruiter's judgments of candidate's cooperativeness. In other words, it appeared that recruiters judged candidate's behavior largely in terms of cooperativeness. Candidate's self-ratings of competitiveness were also significantly correlated with recruiter's ratings of respect shown to candidate,  $r = .23$ , and dyad rapport,  $r = .43$ . When candidates described themselves as competitive, then, recruiters saw them as uncooperative and unpleasant, said they showed them less respect, and felt less rapport with them.

#### *Behavioral intentions*

High FTS candidates were four times more likely (21%) than other candidates (5%) to say they did not expect to be friends with the recruiter after taking the job,  $\chi^2(1, N = 98) = 5.85, p = .02$ . This is evidence that high FTS candidates were more likely to feel the relationship had been threatened during the negotiation. There was no effect associated with recruiter FTS,  $p > .50$ . Candidates indicated how long they thought they would stay in the position they just agreed to take. The mean for the sample as a whole was 27.33 months ( $SD = 1.67$  months), and no significant effects were observed for FTS.

#### *Discussion*

Dyads with a high FTS candidate earned less joint gain than other dyads, as predicted. High FTS candidates described themselves as more competitive, and their competitiveness partially mediated the effects associated with FTS on joint gain, consistent with our prediction. We did not find a main effect associated with recruiter's FTS on joint gain. High FTS candidates described themselves as more competitive and were four times more likely to say they would not be friends with the recruiter after taking the job, indicating that they felt the relationship had been threatened in the course of the negotiation. Recruiters, for their part, said they showed less respect to high FTS candidates than to non-high FTS sensitive candidates. Recruiter's ratings of respect to candidate, dyad rapport, and candidate's likeability, pleasantness and cooperativeness were all correlated with candidate's self-rating of competitiveness. We interpret these correlations as suggesting the following: face threats make a negotiator more competitive, and this competitiveness has a negative impact on the relationship at the negotiation table. We think that face

threat thus leads to competitiveness and a concomitant threat to the relationship, resulting in less joint gain.

In Study 3, role assignment (candidate or recruiter) created a situation in which the individual difference of high FTS had a measurable impact on integrative negotiation outcomes. The candidate in this negotiation owned and was more closely identified with the value of the services that were the subject of the negotiation, and therefore was the negotiator most likely to receive face threats. In Study 3, role assignment also influenced the way in which high FTS negotiators described their behavior. High FTS candidates described themselves as more competitive, whereas high FTS recruiters described themselves as less demanding. This difference helps explain why high FTS candidates who were paired with a high FTS recruiter obtained the greatest percentage of the negotiation pie, whereas high FTS candidates who were paired with non-FTS recruiters earned the smallest percentage.

Study 3 provides evidence that face threat affects negotiation outcomes by making negotiators more competitive, thereby having a negative impact on a dyad's ability to create joint gain. In addition, the results of Study 3 suggest that FTS is an important construct in the application of face theory to negotiation.

#### **General discussion**

Face threat has long been known to affect negotiator behavior and negotiation outcomes (Deutsch, 1961). The studies reported in this paper demonstrate how a negotiator's FTS (face threat sensitivity, defined as an increased likelihood that an individual will have a negative affective reaction to a face threat) can influence the negotiation process and outcomes. Across two different negotiations, a consistent pattern of results emerged in which the hypothesized relationship between high negotiator FTS and a process leading to poor integrative outcomes manifested itself in a failure of dyads to create sufficient value to reach an agreement that would have benefited both parties (Study 2), and a failure of dyads to create value that would potentially have benefited both parties (Study 3). Study 2 found that FTS, depending on role, had a negative impact on negotiators' ability to reach a cooperative settlement. High FTS owners of a service station were twice as likely to "drop the deal," or declare impasse, than non-FTS owners, whereas FTS of buyers did not affect settlement rates. Study 3 found that FTS, depending on role, had a negative impact on joint gain, but not relative share of gain. High FTS job candidates negotiated deals with lower joint gain than non-FTS job candidates, while FTS of recruiters did not affect outcomes. Increased competitiveness on the part of high FTS job candidates mediated the effect associated with their FTS on joint gain.

FTS is a narrow personality trait that is explicitly concerned with the dynamics of social interaction. FTS is correlated with Neuroticism, but conceptually distinct from it and from other measures of interpersonal reactivity: Machiavellianism, empathy, and self-monitoring (Study 1). We believe that we found systematic evidence in negotiations of an effect associated with FTS because we took into account how FTS interacts with the dynamics of a negotiation (Lewin, 1935; Mischel, 1968). A negotiator's high FTS apparently has an effect on negotiation dynamics only when he or she is closely identified with the resources that are the subject of the negotiation. In other words, when a negotiator's face is on the line, high FTS negotiators are more competitive and less cooperative, resulting in fewer agreements (Study 2), less joint gain when they do reach an agreement (Study 3), and a weaker relationship with the other party (Study 3).

Face is a social, interactive construct. There are several potential pathways through which high FTS, once face concerns are activated, could translate to a dropped deal or a roadblock to integrative gain. The first is through the demeanor and behavior of the high FTS negotiator who may be more likely to perceive an opponent's tactics as face-threatening. Face threats result in negative affect, mistrust of the other party, a perception of threat to the relationship, and increased competitiveness vis-à-vis the other party. Through this pathway, we imagine the high FTS negotiator might become offended and withdraw from the negotiation to save face, or alternatively, become vengeful and refuse to cooperate in order to spite the other party. A second pathway is through the perceptions and actions of the high FTS negotiator's opponent who may perceive the high FTS negotiator as "high maintenance," requiring more care and trouble than he/she is worth (Goffman, 1967). Through this pathway, one negotiator's high FTS might increase the cost to the other negotiator of maintaining the interaction, which is a precondition for working together to reach an agreement. The high FTS negotiator's opponent may simply decide it is not worth the effort and withdraw, to find an easier person to deal with. A third pathway is through the chill FTS casts on the interaction between negotiators, making it harder to communicate, to develop trust, to come up with creative alternatives, to coordinate the steps of what Raiffa referred to as "the negotiation dance" (1982, p. 47). Future research is needed to more closely examine the ways in which high FTS affects negotiation processes and outcomes.

Face threats appear to impair a negotiator's efficiency by making him or her more competitive in a situation that requires some level of cooperation.<sup>7</sup> The issue(s) of

a negotiator's—and a negotiation's—efficiency have been the focus of negotiations research since its inception. The dominant paradigm for addressing these questions has been game theory, based on a model of the individual negotiator as a rational decision maker (Raiffa, 1982). This model has given rise to a large literature on rationality and an accompanying attention to cognitive biases as non-rational influences on outcomes (Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000), with cognitive biases even serving as an explanation for motivational influences (Kramer, Newton, & Pommerenke, 1993). The presumption of this powerful paradigm is that a rational negotiator will act to maximize his or her interests (Bazerman & Neale, 1992). For example, it would be possible to interpret our results within the frame of the rational negotiator paradigm as due to a rational choice to give less satisfaction to an opponent (by reducing joint gain) when the opponent issues a face threat, on the assumption that punishing an opponent satisfies the negotiator's interests. Not only does this interpretation beg the question of what is rational, but most of the time, as Brodt and Dietz (1999) gently remind us, negotiators don't actually know how to maximize their interests: a failure of process, rather than rationality, leads to sub-optimal outcomes. In particular, negotiation scholars have had difficulty extending theories of rational behavior to explain the more social aspects of negotiation, particularly the back-and-forth interaction of the negotiation dance. More recent perspectives categorize negotiation as a social interaction (Brodt & Dietz, 1999; Friedman, 1994; Pruitt, 1995; for a review see Thompson & Loewenstein, 2003; Valley, Neale, & Mannix, 1995) in which social processes like communication style directly affect negotiation outcomes (e.g., Adair, Okumura, & Brett, 2001).

Much of the research in this area, like the studies reported above, uses quasi-experimental methods, often drawing participants from a student population (undergraduate, graduate, or adult) and assigning them to enact roles in a negotiation. The external validity of the present studies is limited to the extent that our participants were enacting a role in an exercise, not in Goffman's sense of enacting a role in real life. Although we suspect that the effects associated with FTS would be even greater if negotiators were truly identified with the issues or resources being negotiated (see, e.g., Mandel, 1980; Smyth, 1994, 2002), the present studies do not allow us to conclude that this is so. Further research is needed in real negotiations, where the stakes are higher, to fully establish the external validity of our results. While cultural differences in face threat sensitivity have been documented and generally accepted, the construct of individual differences in face threat sensitivity is still in its early stages of development. We believe there is great potential for the application of this construct in understanding negotiation

<sup>7</sup> An alternative and perhaps complementary explanation, suggested by an anonymous reviewer, is that competitive behavior may have its effects on negotiation outcomes via face threats and FTS.

processes, but we recognize that much work has yet to be done.

Two further limitations of the present work should be noted. First, we considered only positive face, one of two types of face described by Brown and Levinson (1987). Positive face is linked to the desire to have one's public image upheld. Threats to positive face in a negotiation may include challenges, demands, and disagreement. Negative face, the second type, is linked to the desire to be free from imposition. Threats to negative face in a negotiation may include asking for a concession, for information, and for a process change. Some negotiation tactics may thus threaten positive but not negative face, and vice versa. We believe that negative face threat sensitivity could also be relevant to negotiation behavior. More research is thus needed to clarify the construct of what constitutes a face threat in negotiation. Second, further work is necessary to create more robust measurement scales of both positive and negative face threat sensitivity, with a greater number of items and higher  $\alpha$  levels. A clear concern is that we did not observe a monotonic relationship between FTS and outcomes; further research is necessary to determine whether this was a result of limitations of the FTS measure itself or whether it reflects the true nature of the relationship. Future development should also take care to carefully distinguish FTS from other, similar constructs such as Neuroticism.

#### *Applying face theory to emerging negotiations research*

Our results provide a conceptual replication of early work on the impact of face threats on negotiations (Brown, 1968; Deutsch, 1961; Tjosvold, 1977b; Tjosvold & Huston, 1978) showing that face has a measurable impact on negotiator behavior and negotiation outcome, and open the door for further theoretical development in this area. The application of face theory to negotiation has special promise for several emerging lines of research that categorize negotiations as a social interaction: emotion, culture, and communication strategies (the "politeness paradox").

#### *Emotion*

Negotiation practitioners and scholars frequently discuss the tendency of negotiators to take things personally, to get offended, to become upset, or to have a negative affective response during a negotiation. Face theory provides a powerful theoretical base from which to predict, explain and explore negative affective reactions during negotiations. Both positive and negative emotions are related to face, and how an individual's face is maintained or threatened can have immediate and strong impact on his or her emotional state. As Goffman notes, "If events establish a face for [an individual] that is better than he might have expected, he is

likely to 'feel good'; if his ordinary expectations are not fulfilled, one expects that he will 'feel bad' or 'feel hurt'" (1967, p. 6). We need to know more about how one's 'ordinary expectations' interact with the situations commonly found in negotiation. What is clear is that face theory can yield testable hypotheses as to what types of tactics (e.g., non-negotiable demands, Tjosvold, 1977b) will result in a negative affective reaction. Negotiators may be able to use face strategically to affect the emotions of others in ways which enhance their own position (Thompson et al., 1999). There may also be ways to damp down one's own threat sensitivity (Schlenker, Dlugolecki, & Doherty, 1994), particularly when it would lead to an emotion such as anger which can have its own negative effect on negotiation (Allred et al., 1997; Davidson & Greenhalgh, 1999). Face theory provides a theoretical framework for both basic and applied research on emotion in negotiation.

#### *Culture*

*Cross-cultural negotiation.* Cross-cultural researchers have long been aware of the differences in face maintenance across cultures and the impact those differences can have on cross-cultural perceptions and interactions (Ting-Toomey, Gao, Trubisky, & Yang, 1991). For example, face-negotiation theory (Ting-Toomey & Kurogi, 1998) describes how face is negotiated between social interaction partners, and how it becomes problematic particularly in conflict situations and in cross-cultural communication. Mao (1994) points out that although face theory draws extensively on the Chinese concept of face, there are significant differences across cultures in the way face is maintained. We must keep in mind that the results about face and face maintenance we generate with American negotiators may not hold across cultures, and there may be interactions between particular cultures and face that affect cross-cultural negotiations.

*Culture of honor.* Cultures differ in how they sanction individual reactions to a face threat. When the enforcement of social norms relies more on individual integrity and less on public institutions, one's face is even more valuable. Cohen and Nisbett (1994) describe a culture of honor as one that places a high regard on an individual's willingness and ability to respond punitively to a face threat to maintain the individual's status and thus the social order. Someone from a culture of honor, whether it's Spain (Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2002) or the American South (Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, & Schwarz, 1996), is more likely to respond to a threat to honor, what we would call a face threat, than someone else. For example, U.S. Southerners are more likely than Northerners to respond to incidental insults, or face threats, with anger, elevated testosterone, and

aggression (Cohen et al., 1996). The research presented here suggests we might be able to predict when the cultural sensitivity to face threats will interact with the negotiation situation to affect cross-cultural negotiation processes and outcomes.

#### *Politeness paradox*

If face threats are a roadblock to agreement and joint gain, why don't negotiators simply use ingratiation, or redress their demands with politeness, to reduce the impact of the inevitable face threats? According to politeness theory (Brown & Levinson, 1987), people use politeness (e.g., *I see your point but*) to redress face threats (e.g., *I disagree*). Ordinarily politeness serves to redress the harm caused to the receiver's face and mitigate against a negative affective reaction. Of the several factors influencing the degree of politeness a negotiator should use (culture, familiarity, social distance, urgency; Brown & Levinson, 1987), one factor is the relative power between the negotiator and opponent. All other things being equal, the more power a person has, the less politeness he or she will use to redress a face threat. Negotiators face a paradox, then, since using politeness can redress a face threat and help integrative gain (Tjosvold & Huston, 1978), yet it can also be interpreted as weakness and encourage one's

opponent to set more aggressive aspirations (Tjosvold, 1977a, 1978).

#### **Conclusion**

Face concerns exert a gravitational pull on negotiators: powerful, inexorable, invisible. Deutsch claimed that "... whenever bargainers are unable to reach agreement despite the clear existence of a potential agreement that would leave the bargainers in a better position than their position of no agreement—one may suggest that at least one of the bargainers feels that his face has been threatened and that an agreement would lead to loss of face" (1961, p. 896). Indeed, that one bargainer is the one most identified with the subject of the negotiation and thus the one whose face is, so to speak, on the line. Across two studies, we have shown that an aspect of the person (FTS) interacts with the current context (roles) to determine the efficiency of negotiated outcomes. We believe face theory has particular force in current research that examines negotiations process and outcomes from a social perspective, and that individual differences in reactions to face threats can be a useful tool in exploring the psychological dynamics of how face operates in negotiation.

#### **Appendix A. FTS and the personal distress subscale of the IRI (Davis, 1983)**

	FTS1	FTS2	FTS3	PD1	PD2	PD3	PD4	PD5	PD6	PD7
FTS1	(.44)									
FTS2	.51***	(.62)								
FTS3	.37**	.73***	(.55)							
PD1	.14	.44***	.39**	(.40)						
PD2	.42***	.37**	.30*	.43***	(.27)					
PD3	.25	.26*	.00	.24	.52***	(.27)				
PD4	.06	.41***	.37**	.50***	.14	.14	(.39)			
PD5	.11	.37**	.27*	.44***	.23	.17	.44***	(.39)		
PD6	.25	.40**	.22	.37**	.25	.37**	.48***	.48***	(.39)	
PD7	-.10	.33**	.29*	.45***	.05	.18	.63***	.29*	.39**	(.33)
Mean correlation of FTS item with PD items	.16	.37	.26							

Note. Values on the diagonal are mean correlation of item with all other items in its scale.

\*  $p < .05$ .

\*\*  $p < .01$ .

\*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

**Appendix B. Summary matrix of correlations between FTS and participant ratings, Study 3**

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26				
<i>FTS<sup>a</sup></i>																														
1. Candidate																														
2. Recruiter	.00																													
<i>Recruiter's self-ratings</i>																														
3. Likable	-.09	.12																												
4. Competitive	.08	-.05	-.25*																											
5. Pleasant	-.01	-.01	.71***	-.19																										
6. Rational	.05	-.03	.28**	-.07	.33***																									
7. Cooperative	-.07	.03	.39***	-.33***	.40***	.42***																								
8. Demanding	.17	-.14	-.14	.50***	-.14	-.10	-.22*																							
<i>Recruiter's ratings of candidate</i>																														
9. Likable	-.04	.04	.69***	-.16	.60***	.18	.26*	-.06																						
10. Competitive	.07	.03	-.17	.50***	-.21*	-.08	-.07	.25*	-.18																					
11. Pleasant	-.14	.12	.55***	-.15	.55***	.23*	.42***	-.13	.64***	-.14																				
12. Rational	-.07	-.02	.30**	-.40***	.30**	.44***	.37***	-.25*	.21*	-.13	.36***																			
13. Cooperative	-.15	-.13	.37***	-.24*	.44***	.14	.35***	-.08	.52***	-.35***	.50***	.42***																		
14. Demanding	-.05	.06	-.27**	.17	-.35***	-.25*	-.08	.25*	-.24*	.60***	-.18	-.06	-.15																	
<i>Candidate's self-rating</i>																														
15. Likable	.03	-.15	.13	-.13	.35***	.07	.26*	-.21*	.23*	-.33***	.22*	.18	.50***	-.32**																
16. Competitive	.29**	.05	-.18	.05	-.07	-.04	-.19	-.07	-.22*	.14	-.28**	-.06	-.37***	.15	-.18															
17. Pleasant	-.06	-.05	.24*	-.19	.37***	.15	.25*	-.12	.34***	-.27**	.33**	.21*	.42***	-.14	.67***	-.27**														
18. Rational	-.06	.01	.12	-.22*	.09	.07	.19	-.14	.23*	-.19	.16	.16	.29**	.00	.42***	-.04	.49***													
19. Cooperative	-.09	-.04	.30**	-.27**	.24*	-.02	.26*	-.07	.35***	-.32**	.37***	.26*	.49***	-.16	.59***	-.36***	.54***	.43***												
20. Demanding	.08	-.03	-.30**	.10	-.24*	-.07	-.14	.01	-.35***	.16	-.22*	-.23*	-.44***	.17	-.31**	.53***	-.26*	-.08	-.43***											
<i>Candidate's rating of recruiter</i>																														
21. Likable	-.04	.10	.07	-.04	.24*	.11	.24*	-.26*	.18	-.15	.29**	.15	.22*	-.17	.49***	-.10	.51***	.22*	.27**	-.12										
22. Competitive	.21*	-.01	-.12	.02	.00	-.02	-.18	-.06	-.01	.00	-.09	-.15	-.35***	-.04	-.15	.44***	-.17	-.15	-.17	.22*	-.21*									
23. Pleasant	-.02	.02	.25*	-.08	.19	-.03	.18	-.17	.33***	-.12	.27**	.07	.32**	-.20	.41***	-.19	.53***	.38***	.23*	-.17	.73***	-.34***								
24. Rational	.03	.00	.18	-.11	.20	.14	.11	-.11	.39***	-.20	.17	-.11	.13	-.31**	.25*	-.26*	.26*	.28**	.32**	-.17	.27**	.03	.33***							
25. Cooperative	-.15	-.02	.28**	-.22*	.22*	.03	.20	-.18	.33***	-.23*	.34***	.20	.35***	-.18	.44***	-.22*	.49***	.38***	.50***	-.18	.46***	-.35***	.58***	.28**						
26. Demanding	.19	-.07	-.15	.15	-.03	-.03	-.26*	.20	-.07	.11	-.15	-.28**	-.35***	.09	-.23*	.39***	-.25*	-.13	-.25*	.40***	-.35***	.60***	-.42***	-.04	-.40***					

<sup>a</sup>0 = not high, 1 = high.  
 \*  $p < .05$ .  
 \*\*  $p < .01$ .  
 \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

## References

- Abelson, R. P., & Prentice, D. A. (1989). Beliefs as possessions: A functional perspective. In A. R. Pratkanis & S. J. Breckler (Eds.), *Attitude structure and function* (pp. 361–381). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Adair, W. L., Okumura, T., & Brett, J. M. (2001). Negotiation behavior when cultures collide: The United States and Japan. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *86*, 371–385.
- Allred, K. G., Mallozzi, J. S., Matsui, F., & Raia, C. P. (1997). The influence of anger and compassion on negotiation performance. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, *70*, 175–187.
- Ambady, N., & Rosenthal, R. (1992). Thin slices of expressive behavior as predictors of interpersonal consequences: A meta-analysis. *Psychological Bulletin*, *111*, 256–274.
- Anderson, J. C., & Gerbing, D. W. (1988). Structural equation modeling in practice: A review and recommended two-step approach. *Psychological Bulletin*, *103*, 411–423.
- Andersson, L. M., & Pearson, C. M. (1999). Tit for tat? The spiraling effect of incivility in the workplace. *Academy of Management Review*, *24*, 452–471.
- Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator–mediator variable distinction in social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *51*, 1173–1182.
- Barry, B., & Friedman, R. A. (1998). Bargainer characteristics in distributive and integrative negotiation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *74*, 345–359.
- Barry, B., & Stewart, G. L. (1997). Composition, process, and performance in self-managed groups: The role of personality. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *82*, 62–78.
- Bazerman, M. H., Curhan, J. R., Moore, D. A., & Valley, K. L. (2000). Negotiation. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *51*, 279–314.
- Bazerman, M. H., & Neale, M. A. (1992). *Negotiating rationally*. New York: Free Press.
- Brodt, S. E., & Dietz, L. E. (1999). Shared information and information-sharing: Understanding negotiation as collective construal. In R. J. Bies, R. J. Lewicki, & B. H. Sheppard (Eds.), *Research in negotiation in organizations* (Vol. 7, pp. 263–283). Stamford, CT: JAI Press.
- Brown, B. R. (1968). The effects of need to maintain face on interpersonal bargaining. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *4*, 107–122.
- Brown, B. R., & Garland, H. (1971). The effects of incompetency, audience acquaintanceship, and anticipated evaluative feedback on face-saving behavior. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *7*, 490–502.
- Brown, P., & Levinson, S. C. (1987). *Politeness: Some universals in language usage*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Carnevale, P. J. (1995). Property, culture, and negotiation. In R. M. Kramer & D. M. Messick (Eds.), *Negotiation as a social process: New trends in theory and research* (pp. 309–323). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Carnevale, P. J., Pruitt, D. G., & Britton, S. D. (1979). Looking tough: The negotiator under constituent surveillance. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *5*, 118–121.
- Carson, C. L., & Cupach, W. R. (2000). Facing corrections in the workplace: The influence of perceived face threat on the consequences of managerial reproaches. *Journal of Applied Communication Research*, *28*, 215–234.
- Christie, R., & Geis, F. L. (1970). *Studies in Machiavellianism*. New York: Academic Press.
- Church, A. T., & Burke, P. J. (1994). Exploratory and confirmatory tests of the Big Five and Tellegen's three- and four-dimensional models. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *66*, 93–114.
- Cohen, D., & Nisbett, R. E. (1994). Self-protection and the culture of honor: Explaining Southern violence. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *20*, 551–567.
- Cohen, D., Nisbett, R. E., Bowdle, B. F., & Schwarz, N. (1996). Insult, aggression, and the southern culture of honor: An experimental ethnography. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *70*, 945–960.
- Cortina, J. M. (1993). What is coefficient alpha? An examination of theory and applications. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *78*, 98–104.
- Costa, P. T., & McCrae, R. R. (1992). *Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R) and NEO Five-Factor (NEO-FFI) Inventory professional manual*. Odessa, FL: PAR.
- Cupach, W. R., & Carson, C. L. (2002). Characteristics and consequences of interpersonal complaints associated with perceived face threat. *Journal of Social and Personal Relationships*, *19*, 443–462.
- Cupach, W. R., & Messman, S. J. (1999). Face predilections and friendship solidarity. *Communication Reports*, *12*, 13–19.
- Davidson, M. N., & Greenhalgh, L. (1999). The role of emotion in negotiation: The impact of anger and race. In R. J. Bies, R. J. Lewicki, & B. H. Sheppard (Eds.), *Research in negotiation in organizations* (Vol. 7, pp. 3–26). Stamford, CT: JAI Press.
- Davis, M. H. (1980). A multidimensional approach to individual differences in empathy. *Catalog of Selected Documents in Psychology*, *10 MS*, 2124, 85.
- Davis, M. H. (1983). Measuring individual differences in empathy: Evidence for a multidimensional approach. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *44*, 113–126.
- Deutsch, M. (1961). The face of bargaining. *Operations Research*, *9*, 886–897.
- Earley, P. C. (1997). *Face, harmony, and social structure: An analysis of organizational behavior across cultures*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Forgas, J. P. (1998). On feeling good and getting your way: Mood effects on negotiator cognition and bargaining strategies. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *74*, 565–577.
- Friedman, R. A. (1994). *Front stage, backstage: The dramatic structure of labor negotiations*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Froman, L. A., Jr., & Cohen, M. D. (1970). Compromise and logroll: Comparing the efficiency of two bargaining processes. *Behavioral Science*, *15*, 180–183.
- Garland, H., & Brown, B. R. (1972). Face-saving as affected by subjects' sex, audiences' sex and audience expertise. *Sociometry*, *35*, 280–289.
- Goffman, E. (1967). *Interaction ritual: Essays on face-to-face interaction*. Oxford, England: Aldine.
- Goldberg, L. R. (1993). The structure of phenotypic personality traits. *American Psychologist*, *48*, 26–34.
- Goldberg, S. B. (1997). *Texoil*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University, Dispute Resolution Research Center.
- Greenhalgh, L., Neslin, S. A., & Gilkey, R. W. (1985). The effects of negotiator preferences, situational power, and negotiator personality on outcomes of business negotiations. *Academy of Management Journal*, *28*, 9–33.
- James, W. (1890). *The principles of psychology*. Oxford, England: Holt.
- Jordan, J. M., & Roloff, M. E. (1997). Planning skills and negotiator goal accomplishment. *Communication Research*, *24*, 31–63.
- Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J., & Thaler, R. (1990). Experimental tests of the endowment effect and the coase theorem. *Journal of Political Economy*, *98*, 1325–1348.
- Keltner, D., & Anderson, C. (2000). Saving face for Darwin: The functions and uses of embarrassment. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, *9*, 187–192.
- Keltner, D., & Buswell, B. N. (1996). Evidence for the distinctness of embarrassment, shame, and guilt: A study of recalled antecedents and facial expressions of emotion. *Cognition and Emotion*, *10*, 155–171.

- Keltner, D., & Buswell, B. N. (1997). Embarrassment: Its distinct form and appeasement functions. *Psychological Bulletin*, *122*, 250–270.
- Keltner, D., & Haidt, J. (1999). Social functions of emotions at four levels of analysis. *Cognition and Emotion*, *13*, 505–521.
- Kenny, D. A., Kashy, D. A., & Bolger, N. (1998). Data analysis in social psychology. In D. T. Gilbert & S. T. Fiske (Eds.), *The handbook of social psychology* (4th ed., pp. 233–265). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
- Kimmel, M. J., Pruitt, D. G., Magenau, J. M., Konar-Goldband, E., & Carnevale, P. J. (1980). Effects of trust, aspiration, and gender on negotiation tactics. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *38*, 9–22.
- Kramer, R. M., Newton, E., & Pommerenke, P. L. (1993). Self-enhancement biases and negotiator judgment: Effects of self-esteem and mood. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, *56*, 110–133.
- Kray, L. J., Galinsky, A. D., & Thompson, L. (2002). Reversing the gender gap in negotiations: An exploration of stereotype regeneration. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, *87*, 386–409.
- Lax, D. A., & Sebenius, J. K. (1986). *The manager as negotiator*. New York: Free Press.
- Lee, F. (1993). Being polite and keeping MUM: How bad news is communicated in organizational hierarchies. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, *23*, 1124–1149.
- Leichty, G., & Applegate, J. L. (1991). Social-cognitive and situational influences on the use of face-saving persuasive strategies. *Human Communication Research*, *17*, 451–484.
- Lewin, K. (1935). *A dynamic theory of personality*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Linde, C. (1988). The quantitative study of communicative success: Politeness and accidents in aviation discourse. *Language in Society*, *17*, 375–399.
- Lindsay, S. L., & Braithwaite, C. A. (1996). You should ‘wear a mask’: Facework norms in cultural and intercultural conflict in maquiladoras. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, *20*, 199–225.
- Lynch, D. R., & Evans, T. D. (2002). Attributes of highly effective criminal defense negotiators. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, *30*, 387–396.
- Mack, D. (1972). Personality, payoff information, and behavior in a two-person bargaining game. *Acta Psychologica*, *36*, 125–144.
- Mandel, R. (1980). Roots of the modern interstate border dispute. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *24*, 427–454.
- Mao, L. R. (1994). Beyond politeness theory: Face revisited and renewed. *Journal of Pragmatics*, *21*, 451–486.
- McCrae, R. R., & John, O. P. (1992). An introduction to the five-factor model and its applications. *Journal of Personality*, *60*, 175–215.
- McCrae, R. R., Zonderman, A. B., Costa, P. T., Jr., & Bond, M. H. (1996). Evaluating replicability of factors in the Revised NEO Personality Inventory: Confirmatory factor analysis versus Procrustes rotation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *70*, 552–566.
- Metts, S. (1997). Face and facework: Implications for the study of personal relationships. In S. Duck (Ed.), *Handbook of personal relationships: Theory, research and interventions* (2nd ed., pp. 373–390). Chichester, UK: Wiley.
- Mischel, W. (1968). *Personality and assessment*. New York: Wiley.
- Mosquera, P. M. R., Manstead, A. S. R., & Fischer, A. H. (2002). The role of honor concerns in emotional reactions to offences. *Cognition and Emotion*, *16*, 143–163.
- Neale, M. A. (1997). *New recruit*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University, Dispute Resolution Research Center.
- O’Connor, K. M., Arnold, J. A., & Burriss, E. (2003). *Negotiators’ bargaining histories and their effects on future negotiation performance*. Ithaca, NY: Center for Leadership in Dynamic Organizations, Cornell University.
- Oatway, R. A. (1997). The impact of face giving and threat sensitivity behavior on communication in supervisor/subordinate dyads (Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1997). *Dissertation Abstracts International* (Vol. 58, p. 2752).
- Pearson, C. M., Andersson, L. M., & Porath, C. L. (2000). Assessing and attacking workplace incivility. *Organizational Dynamics*, *29*, 123–137.
- Pruitt, D. G. (1995). Networks and collective scripts: Paying attention to structure in bargaining theory. In R. M. Kramer & D. M. Messick (Eds.), *Negotiation as a social process: New trends in theory and research* (pp. 37–47). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Pruitt, D. G., Carnevale, P. J., Forcey, B., & Van Slyck, M. (1986). Gender effects in negotiation: Constituent surveillance and contentious behavior. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *22*, 264–275.
- Raiffa, H. (1982). *The art and science of negotiation*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Rubin, J. Z., & Brown, B. R. (1975). *The social psychology of bargaining and negotiation*. New York: Academic Press.
- Schlenker, B. R., Dlugolecki, D. W., & Doherty, K. (1994). The impact of self-presentations on self-appraisals and behavior: The power of public commitment. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *20*, 20–33.
- Schmit, M. J., & Ryan, A. M. (1993). The Big Five in personnel selection: Factor structure in applicant and nonapplicant populations. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *78*, 966–974.
- Smyth, L. F. (1994). Intractable conflicts and the role of identity. *Negotiation Journal*, *10*, 311–321.
- Smyth, L. F. (2002). Identity-based conflicts: A systemic approach. *Negotiation Journal*, *18*, 147–161.
- Snyder, M. (1974). Self-monitoring of expressive behavior. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *30*, 526–537.
- Snyder, M. (1987). *Public appearances, private realities: The psychology of self-monitoring*. New York: W.H. Freeman.
- Thaler, R. (1980). Toward a positive theory of consumer choice. *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, *1*, 39–60.
- Thompson, L., & Hastie, R. (1990). Social perception in negotiation. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, *47*, 98–123.
- Thompson, L., & Loewenstein, J. (2003). Mental models of negotiations. In M. A. Hogg & J. Cooper (Eds.), *Sage handbook of social psychology*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Thompson, L., Nadler, J., & Kim, P. H. (1999). Some like it hot: The case for the emotional negotiator. In L. Thompson (Ed.), *LEA’s organization and management series, Shared cognition in organizations: The management of knowledge* (pp. 139–161). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Ting-Toomey, S., & Crocrot, B.-A. (1994). Face and facework: Theoretical and research issues. In S. Ting-Toomey (Ed.), *The challenge of facework: Cross-cultural and interpersonal issues* (pp. 307–340). Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Ting-Toomey, S., Gao, G., Trubisky, P., Yang, Z., Kim, H., Lin, S., & Nishida, T. (1991). Culture, face maintenance, and styles of handling interpersonal conflicts: A study in five cultures. *International Journal of Conflict Management*, *2*, 275–296.
- Ting-Toomey, S., & Kurogi, A. (1998). Facework competence in intercultural conflict: An updated face-negotiation theory. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, *22*, 187–225.
- Tjosvold, D. (1977a). The effects of the constituent’s affirmation and the opposing negotiator’s self-presentation in bargaining between unequal status groups. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, *18*, 146–157.
- Tjosvold, D. (1977b). Low power person’s strategies in bargaining: Negotiability of demand, maintaining face, and race. *International Journal of Group Tensions*, *7*, 29–41.
- Tjosvold, D. (1978). Affirmation of the high-power person and his position: Ingratiation in conflict. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, *8*, 230–243.

- Tjosvold, D., & Huston, T. L. (1978). Social face and resistance to compromise in bargaining. *Journal of Social Psychology, 104*, 57–68.
- Tracy, S. J. (2002). When questioning turns to face threat: An interactional sensitivity in 911 call-taking. *Western Journal of Communication, 66*, 129–157.
- Trubisky, P., Ting-Toomey, S., & Lin, S.-I. (1991). The influence of individualism-collectivism and self-monitoring on conflict styles. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 15*, 65–84.
- Tynan, R. O. (1999, August). *The impact of threat sensitivity and face giving on information transfer in organizational hierarchies*. Paper presented at the Academy of Management Conference, Chicago, IL.
- Valley, K. L., Neale, M. A., & Mannix, F. A. (1995). Friends, lovers, colleagues, strangers: The effects of relationships on the process and outcome of dyadic negotiations. In R. J. Bies, R. Lewicki, & B. Sheppard (Eds.), *Research on negotiation in organizations*. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
- Walton, R. E., & McKersie, R. B. (1965). *Behavioral theory of labor negotiations: An analysis of a social interaction system*. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
- Wilson, S. R. (1992). Face and facework in negotiation. In L. L. Putnam & M. E. Roloff (Eds.), *Communication and negotiation* (pp. 176–205). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.