FIRM STRUCTURE, MULTINATIONALS, AND MANUFACTURING PLANT DEATHS

Andrew B. Bernard and J. Bradford Jensen*

Abstract—Plant shutdowns shape industry productivity, the dynamics of employment, and industrial restructuring. Plant closures account for more than half of gross job destruction in U.S. manufacturing. This paper examines the effects of firm structure on U.S. manufacturing plant closures. Plants belonging to multiplant firms and those owned by U.S. multinationals are less likely to exit. However, the superior survival chances are due to the characteristics of the plants rather than the nature of the firms. Controlling for plant and industry attributes, we find that plants owned by multunit firms and U.S. multinationals are much more likely to close.

I. Introduction

Plant shutdowns shape industry and aggregate productivity paths and play a major role in the dynamics of employment, the evolution of regional economies, and industrial restructuring. Over a typical five-year period, more than 30% of U.S. manufacturing plants shut down, accounting for more than 17% of manufacturing employment. Between 1992 and 1997, plant closures eliminated more than 2.8 million jobs and accounted for 58% of gross job destruction in the U.S. manufacturing sector (see table 1). Plant births and deaths “contribute disproportionately to industry productivity growth,” accounting for as much as 35% of average annual multifactor productivity growth (Foster, Haltiwanger, & Krizan, 2001). In addition to plant shutdowns being an important contributor to macroeconomic trends, plant shutdown is one of the few unambiguous observed signals of plant performance and thus is of inherent interest at a micro level.

The importance of plant shutdowns has led to a growing literature on the determinants of plant exit. However, this literature has focused on plant characteristics and has largely ignored the role of the firm in the shutdown decision. If single-plant firms account for the bulk of employment and output in the U.S. economy or if plants owned by multunits behave no differently from single units, the exclusion of firm characteristics would be a minor oversight. The focus of this paper is to examine the role of firm structure in the decision to close a plant.

The need to examine the role of firm characteristics is highlighted by the prevalence of multiunit and multinational firms. U.S. manufacturing is dominated both by multiplant and by multinational firms. While multiunit firms account for 17% of U.S. manufacturing firms, and 39% of all manufacturing plants, they employ 78% of the manufacturing workforce and produce 88% of the output (see table 2). U.S. multinationals are even more important than their small numbers would suggest. U.S.-based multinational firms, that is, those with more than 10% of their assets abroad, represent only 1% of all firms in manufacturing and own only 6% of all manufacturing plants. However, these multinationals employ 26% of the workforce and produce 34% of total manufacturing output. In addition to being significant in terms of employment, multiunit and multinational firms are also important contributors to employment dynamics—plant shutdowns at multiplant (multinational) firms account for 68% (21%) of employment at closing plants.

Given the prevalence of multiunit and multinational firms, this paper considers the importance of firm structure in the operating decision to close a plant. We focus on three aspects of the firm’s role. First, we ask whether the existence of other plants within the firm affects the shutdown probability; are multiplant firms more or less likely to close a plant than a single-plant firm? Second, we look at the effect of operations outside the United States on the survival of domestic plants; do U.S. multinationals shut down their plants more or less frequently? Finally, we examine the effect of a change in ownership on plant survival; do takeover targets close more often?

---

* Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth and NBER; and Institute for International Economics, respectively.

This is a drastically revised and shortened version of NBER working paper #9026 titled “The Deaths of Manufacturing Plants.” Bernard thanks the National Science Foundation (SES-0241474) for research support. We thank Steve Redding and Peter Schott for numerous helpful discussions. The research in this paper was conducted while the authors were Special Sworn Status researchers of the U.S. Census Bureau at the Boston Census Research Data Center and the Center for Economic Studies. Results and conclusions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Census Bureau or the NBER. This paper has been screened to ensure that no confidential data are revealed.

1 Data tabulated by the authors from the Longitudinal Research Database of the Bureau of the Census.

2 The importance of multinationals in the U.S. economy is large and rising over time. Multinationals based in the United States accounted for 26% of total employment in 1993, rising to 29% in 2000, and these global firms control more than 90% of all U.S. trade, both exports and imports (Bernard, Jensen, & Schott, 2005).
The existing theoretical literature is largely silent on these issues of firm characteristics and plant survival. Multiplant firms may be less likely to close a plant because they can shift resources within the firm in bad times, or they may be more likely to close a plant since such plant closures do not also shut down the firm. Similarly, U.S. multinationals may have lower plant shutdown probabilities because of their international reach, or they may have higher probabilities because of their ability to shift production around the world in response to adverse shocks at home. Ownership changes produce similar ambiguity: a takeover target may have desirable features and thus a lower shutdown probability, or may be an ex post poor match for the firm and thus more likely to close.

While the theoretical possibilities are ambiguous, our empirical results are quite clear. The probability of death is substantially lower for those plants that are part of a multiplant firm. Similarly, domestic plants owned by U.S. multinationals are far less likely to close than plants in purely domestic firms. Finally, the unconditional probability of death is substantially lower for plants that have recently changed ownership.

However, the lower probability of closure for these plants is driven by characteristics of the plants and the industries where they are active. We show that plants at multunit and multinational firms are substantially larger, older, and more productive than single-plant firms. Once we control for these plant attributes known to reduce the probability of shutdown, we find that plants at multunit or multinational firms have significantly greater chances of being closed. In particular, a plant that differs substantially in its production technique from the rest of the firm is the most likely to be closed by a multiplant firm. Our findings suggest that firms with multiple production locations, either domestic or foreign, are more likely to use plant shutdown as a margin of adjustment.

Our findings contribute to a wide range of research in industrial organization and to literatures in international trade and investment. A large body of theoretical and empirical research in industrial organization has considered the role of plant attributes in determining plant survival. Our findings strongly suggest an important role for broader firm characteristics in the decision to close plants, especially those linked to firm structure and ownership. The role of plant dissimilarity within the firm in the shutdown decision suggests that the overall composition of the firm’s activities matters for plant survival.

In addition to examining the role of firms and firm structure in plant survival, we extend the existing literature on the role of plant attributes themselves. While numerous studies have recognized that plant size, age, and productivity are important determinants of plant survival, we find additional positive effects of capital and skill intensity at the plant. Within and across industries, survival probabilities are greater for plants with high capital-labor ratios and those with relatively skilled, high-wage workers. In addition, single-product plants are much more likely to fail in any five-year period than establishments producing multiple goods. Our results add to the literature on firm and plant heterogeneity, which emphasize the importance of reallocation and the Darwinian selection process by which failing plants exit and successful plants prosper.

Our work is also linked to emerging literatures in international trade and investment. Recent work in international trade has focused on the interaction between exporting and firm performance, highlighting the causality from high productivity to exporting and the lack of causality from exporting to productivity gains. We find evidence that (high productivity) exporting plants are also significantly less likely to die. The export status of the plant reduces the probability of shutdown by as much as 15% even after accounting for plant size, productivity, factor intensity, and ownership structure. A large body of research on multinationals has established that multinationals pay higher wages than non-multinationals. Our findings on the role of multinationals in plant closure suggest a potential (partial) explanation for the wage premium. Higher wages at multinationals may partially compensate workers for the increased risk of plant closure and job loss. Newer work on multinationals has emphasized the interaction between cross-border...
activity and the structure of the firm.\textsuperscript{5} Our findings on the role of multinational ownership in plant shutdowns points to further links between contracting, cross-border investment, and employment outcomes in the domestic market.

We also provide some of the first direct evidence on the link between rising cross-border investment and domestic labor market outcomes. Rodrik (1997) suggests that multinationals will be more likely to adjust employment levels than non-multinationals, hypothesizing a more elastic labor demand curve. We focus only on adjustments along the extensive margin but indeed find that multinationals are more likely to close comparable plants than non-multinationals. However, beneficial attributes of multinational plants such as larger size and higher productivity mean that the rise of multinationals will not necessarily lead to aggregate increases in employment volatility.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly summarizes the literature on firms and plant deaths and describes the competing hypotheses on the role of firm structure. In section III, we give a brief overview of the data and describe the construction of the firm-level variables. Section IV reports the relationship between the unconditional probability of plant shutdown and a wide range of firm, plant, and industry characteristics. Section V presents the main results on plant death from our multivariate empirical specification and estimates the effect of firm ownership controlling for plant attributes. Section VI concludes.

## II. Firms and Plant Closures

The determinants of plant deaths have been an active area of empirical and theoretical research. Dunne et al. (1988, 1989) established the strong comovement of industry exit and entry rates as well as the relationship between plant survival and plant age, size, and type of ownership. Their work emphasized the importance of sunk entry costs in determining death rates as well as the large degree of heterogeneity across plants within industries. Subsequent theoretical work has resulted in a number of models of industries with heterogeneous firms, in part designed to match the stylized facts of the empirical literature.\textsuperscript{6} While these papers have emphasized the importance of understanding the shutdown decision in modeling the dynamics of industry and aggregate productivity, they have all maintained the assumption of single-plant firms.

The existing literature linking plant closure to firm type usually considers exit only in the context of a declining industry. Typically in such studies the focus is on the pattern of plant closure within an industry with the “decline” of the industry taken as exogenous. Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1985) show that in a duopoly with Cournot competition, equal costs, and declining demand, the largest firm exits first, as the smaller producer will be a successful monopolist for longer. Allowing for cost advantages for large firms can overturn the theoretical results if the cost differentials are substantial enough. Whinston (1988) shows that the single-plant assumption is important for the results on size and exit and argues that plants in multiplant firms may be more likely to exit. Reynolds (1988) and Dierickx, Matutes, and Neven (1991) predict that high-variable-cost plants should exit first.

The results from the related empirical literature on plant deaths in declining industries are mixed, although all studies confirm the finding of Dunne et al. (1989) that larger plants are less likely to exit. Lieberman (1990) [chemicals] and Baden-Fuller (1989) [steel casings] find that diversified firms are more likely to close plants, although Deily (1991) finds no such effect in the steel industry. Gibson and Harris (1996) examine plant exit during a period of trade liberalization and quota reduction in New Zealand. They find that large, old, low-cost establishments are more likely to survive the liberalization, and diversified multiplant firms are more likely to close plants.

Studies of a wider range of industries typically report lower death rates for plants at multiunit firms. Dunne et al. (1989) find lower failure rates for large multiunit plants than for large single-unit plants. Disney et al. (2003) estimate hazard rates for U.K. manufacturing plants. They also find survival probabilities are higher for establishments that are part of a larger group and that hazards decline more slowly at these plants. Their results suggest that group ownership reduces the probability of plant death, and they argue that there may be evidence for models of market selection based on learning.

The literature on the role of multinationals in plant shutdowns is small and relatively recent. Gibson and Harris (1996) [New Zealand], Görg and Strobl (2003) [Ireland], and Bernard and Sjöholm (2003) [Indonesia] all find that plants with some foreign ownership are more likely to close than purely domestically owned plants, conditional on controlling for plant characteristics. In all these studies, the focus is on the effect of foreign ownership in the shutdown process. In contrast, we consider the role of ownership by a domestic multinational firm on plant shutdowns in the home country.

### A. Firms and Plant Survival

While the focus of this paper is on empirics, we first offer a brief discussion of the role of firm structure in increasing or decreasing the probability of plant failure. The focus of our analysis on plant deaths is to separately identify the role of firm structure from that of plant characteristics.

We consider two related hypotheses in our empirical work: first, a plant that is part of a larger firm, either multiplant or multinational, is more likely to survive, and, second, ownership by a larger firm enhances a plant’s

---

\textsuperscript{5} See Antràs (2003); Antràs and Helpman (2004); Grossman and Helpman (2004); and Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2005).

survival probability. The first hypothesis is about the unconditional relationship between plant survival and ownership, while the second hypothesis focuses on the marginal effect of ownership structure on plant survival conditioning on plant characteristics.

Large firms tend to have large plants and other characteristics that are associated with higher survival probabilities (see table 5 and the discussion in section IV C below). This fact alone should lead to lower death probabilities for plants that are part of both multiplant and multinational firms. Plant attributes that increase survival tend to be more common in larger firms, and we expect to find higher survival probabilities at plants in these firms.

However, once one controls for the features of the plant, it is unclear whether ownership by a multiplant or a multinational firm is positively or negatively associated with survival. On the one hand, multiplant and multinational firms may improve the survival chances of their constituent plants. These larger, and potentially diversified, firms may have access to resources, for example, external or internal sources of capital, that can help them avoid plant shutdown in the face of negative shocks such as a temporary drop in demand for one of their products.

On the other hand, ownership of a plant by a multiunit firm or a multinational may actually increase the probability of death if such firms have the flexibility to reduce production by closing a plant without exiting the market altogether. Single-plant firms cannot cease production and continue to exist as a viable firm.\(^7\)

Plants that experience an ownership change have a similar ambiguity in their survival outcomes. Such plants may have relatively desirable ex ante characteristics that make them attractive acquisitions and reduce their probability of failure. Even controlling for the quality of the plant, an ownership change may be associated with an improved match of plant to firm and thus a reduced chance of closure. However, there is uncertainty in the profitability of any new match, and this may lead to higher ex post shutdown rates for plants that experience a change in owners. In addition, firms may acquire plants in order to reduce capacity in the industry by shutting them down.

### III. Data

The data we use to examine these hypotheses come from the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD) of the Bureau of the Census. We use two panels from the Censuses of Manufactures (CM), one running from 1987 to 1992 and the second from 1992 to 1997.\(^8\) The sampling unit for the Census is a manufacturing establishment, or plant, and the sampling frame in each Census year includes detailed information on inputs, output, and ownership on all establishments.

We define a plant to have died if it is in the LRD in year \(t\) but absent from the Census in year \(t + 5\) and beyond. Plant deaths are separately recorded from other potentially confounding events such as a change in ownership, a temporary shutdown, or a fall in employment to low levels. From the Census, we obtain plant characteristics including location, capital stock, the quantity of and wages paid to nonproduction and production workers, total value of shipments, total value of exports, energy and purchased material inputs, the number of products produced at the plant, the primary four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC), and age. We also can match plants to their parent firms and obtain information on the number of manufacturing plants in the firm, the share of total firm assets held overseas, and changes in ownership.

To develop our sample of plants, we make several modifications to the basic data in the LRD after creating our indicator of plant death. First, we drop any plants classified as “administrative records” in year \(t\). These plants are quite small, typically with fewer than ten workers, and have no information on inputs other than total employment. Next, we drop any industry whose products are categorized as “not elsewhere classified.” These “industries” are typically catch-all categories for groups of heterogeneous products. In practice, this corresponds to any industry whose four-digit SIC code ends in 9. Finally, we also drop any establishment that does not report one of the input or output measures. We are left with 236,000+ plant-year observations across the two panels.

**A. Firm Characteristics**

In this section we describe the construction of the variables related to multiplant firms, multinationals, and ownership change. We also summarize the additional plant and industry characteristics. A detailed description of the other plant and industry controls is given in the appendix.

**Multiplant:** A plant is said to belong to a multiplant firm if there is at least one other plant with the same firm ownership number,\(^9\)

\[
\text{multi}_i = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } \exists \text{ at least one other plant with the} \\
0 & \text{same FirmID} \\
\end{cases}
\]

**Dissimilarity:** To assess whether a plant is relatively similar to or different from other plants in the firm, we create a measure of dissimilarity based on input cost shares of the plant and firm.\(^10\)

\(^7\) If there are distinct sunk costs of creating a plant and creating a firm, then a single-plant firm will have a wider hysteretic band than a plant in a multiplant firm.

\(^8\) Due to limitations of the multinational and export measures, we must start our sample with the 1987 Census.

\(^9\) The multiplant dummy equals 0 for single-plant firms.

\(^10\) Gollop and Monahan (1991) use this measure to capture product similarity in their construction of an index of diversification.
\[ \text{dissimilarity}_i = \left( \frac{\sum_j (w_{jp} - w_{jf})^2}{2} \right)^{1/2}, \]  

(1)

where \( w_{jp} \) is the input cost share of the \( j \)th input in the plant and \( w_{jf} \) is the input cost share of the \( j \)th input in the firm (excluding the plant).\(^{11}\) We consider five inputs—production workers, nonproduction workers, materials, energy, and capital—and impose constant returns to scale. The dissimilarity measure is 0 when the plant has an identical cost structure to the firm, for example, for a single-plant firm, and approaches 1 as the cost structures diverge.

**Standalone:** We construct an additional measure of plant-firm similarity based on the industry of the plant’s output. This measure is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the plant is part of a multiplant firm and is the only establishment in the firm producing in the SIC4 industry,

\[ \text{standalone}_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \text{multi}_i = 1 \text{ and } \text{the same industry (SIC4)} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise}. \end{cases} \]

**Multinational:** We construct a measure of multinational status as a function of the share of firm assets held overseas. We define a U.S. multinational to be a firm with at least 10% of its assets held outside the United States in 1987,

\[ \text{USMNC} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \frac{\text{Foreign Assets}}{\text{Total Assets}} \geq 0.1 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise}. \end{cases} \]

The assets measure is available only for U.S. firms, so we cannot construct a measure of foreign multinational ownership in our sample.\(^{12}\) This means that plants owned by foreign multinationals are grouped into the category that includes firms with no foreign presence.

**Ownership change:** A plant is said to have changed owners in the previous five years if the firm ID in the data set changes,

\[ \text{takeover}_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \text{Firm}_i \neq \text{Firm}_{i-5} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise}. \end{cases} \]

For plants that did not exist in year \( i - 5 \) we assume there was no change in ownership. Unfortunately, we cannot distinguish between various types of ownership changes, such as between hostile and friendly transfers.

**B. Plant Characteristics**

In order to identify the role of firms in plant shutdowns, we need to control for a comprehensive set of plant and industry characteristics. Both the existing theoretical literature and previous empirical work suggest that plant age, size, and productivity play important roles in determining plant survival. We construct plant measures of log employment, years of operation, and multifactor productivity.

Beyond these attributes, we include measures of plant capital and skill intensity. Capital intensity at the plant is measured by the log of the capital-labor ratio. Skill intensity is harder to measure in the LRD, as there is relatively little information on the characteristics of the workforce. We include the average wages paid to the each of the two types of labor, production and nonproduction, to crudely proxy for skill.

Recent models of heterogeneous plants and international trade by Melitz (2003) and Bernard et al. (2003) predict that an exporting plant should have a lower probability of failure than a nonexporter. In these models, the positive relationship between exporting and productivity is driven by the interaction of positive trade costs and variation in productivity across plants. We recognize that exporting may proxy for other unobservable, desirable characteristics of the plant. Our export measure is an indicator variable that is 1 when the plant exports and 0 otherwise.

We also consider a measure of the market heterogeneity of the plant’s output through the number of products that it makes. If every new product requires additional sunk costs of entry, then multiproduct plants will have lower failure probabilities.

**C. Industry and Geography**

As we are using information from the entire manufacturing sector, we would like to ensure that our results are robust to unobserved industry and geographic factors that cause variation in plant deaths.

The magnitude of the sunk costs of entry is of primary importance in determining the steady-state rate of firm births and deaths within an industry (see Dunne et al., 1988, 1989). Since our focus is not on the estimation of industry sunk entry costs and because entry costs may covary with, or be determined by, plant characteristics such as capital or skill intensity, we attempt to control for entry costs in our multivariate empirical specification. We control for industry heterogeneity in two ways. First, we include industry fixed effects. The industry fixed effects represent the primary four-digit SIC industry of each plant. Second, we construct a measure to proxy for unobserved industry sunk costs of entry or exit (see the appendix for details). Our results are
in the sample shut down. Of surviving plants, 40.1 percent belong to multiplant firms, as opposed to 35.9% of plants that exit (table 3). Unconditionally, belonging to a multiplant firm is associated with a 3.4-percentage-point reduction in the probability of death for the plant (column I in table 4). This is a large reduction relative to the 26.9% overall probability of plant failure. However, once we control for industry fixed effects, we find no difference in the shutdown probability for multiplant establishments (column II in table 4).

The similarity of the plant to the firm also differs significantly between survivors and shutdowns. The measure of dissimilarity is higher for deaths, 0.532, than for survivors, 0.472. When we add the dissimilarity measure to a probit with a multiplant dummy (bottom panel of table 4), we find a much bigger effect for multiplant status; the probability of death is 10.6 percentage points lower. The coefficient on dissimilarity is positive and significant, indicating plants that have less similar cost shares to the firm as a whole are more likely to close. Controlling for industry effects, we

---

**Table 3.—Means of Characteristics for Surviving and Closing Plants**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plant Type</th>
<th>Survivors</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Firm characteristics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiplant</td>
<td>0.401</td>
<td>0.359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multinational</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>0.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takeover</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>0.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissimilarity†</td>
<td>0.472</td>
<td>0.532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Plant characteristics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size (log employment)</td>
<td>3.661</td>
<td>3.185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>13.260</td>
<td>9.510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital intensity (log K/L)</td>
<td>3.185</td>
<td>2.888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonproduction wage (log)</td>
<td>3.284</td>
<td>3.154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production wage (log)</td>
<td>2.857</td>
<td>2.733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total factor productivity (log)</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>-0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiproduct plant</td>
<td>0.676</td>
<td>0.547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exporter</td>
<td>0.221</td>
<td>0.121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entry cost</td>
<td>0.681</td>
<td>0.645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of plants</td>
<td>172,536</td>
<td>63,556</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All means for survivors are significantly different from those for deaths at the 1% level. Dissimilarity measures the difference in cost shares between the plant and the firm and is calculated only for plants that are part of a multiplant firm.

---

**IV. Plant Shutdown Estimates**

We start by reporting the unconditional relationship between the complete set of variables and the probability of plant death. Table 3 reports the mean of each variable for two types of plants, deaths and survivors. Column I of table 4 gives the marginal effect on the probability of plant shutdown from a univariate probit of plant death of the form

$$\Pr(D_{pt} = 1|X_t) = \Phi(c_t + \beta X_t),$$

where $X_t$ is the characteristic in year $t$ and $c_t$ is a full set of year dummies. Column II includes SIC4 industry fixed effects. The probits are run on the full sample of plants from 1987–1997. Standard errors are robust to repeated observations on individual plants.

**A. Firm Characteristics**

The two panels have 236,092 plant-year observations and, on average, over a five-year period, 26.9% of the plants

---

13 We allow for time variation in our measure of industry entry costs so it is feasible to include both industry fixed effects and the sunk cost measure.

14 This is lower than the rate for all manufacturing plants, 32%, as the sample excludes most establishments with ten or fewer employees.
find a similar pattern of results, although the magnitudes are reduced: the multplant dummy is negative and significant, while the dissimilarity measure is positive and significant.

Turning to multinational ownership, we find that domestic plants owned by U.S. multinationals are more likely to be found among survivors (7.0% versus 5.0%) and unconditionally, these plants have a 6.4-percentage-point reduction in their probability of death. Even controlling for industry effects, we see that plants at U.S. multinationals have a significantly lower shutdown probability.

Finally, looking at changes in ownership, we again find takeover targets are more likely to have survived to the next Census; they represent 9.7% of survivors and only 8.5% of deaths. The probability of closure was 2.8 percentage points lower for plants that experienced an ownership change in the previous five years than at plants without an ownership change. With industry controls, the takeover variable is no longer significantly different from 0.

### B. Plant and Industry Characteristics

Considering the role of plant attributes in shutdown, we confirm the findings of prior research that survival is positively associated with size, age, and productivity in our data. Survivors are more than 40% larger in terms of employment than exits (table 3) and the marginal probability of death is sharply declining in plant size (table 4). Plants that die are 9.5 years old in year $t$ in our sample, while plants that survive are 3.8 years older, according to this measure. The marginal effect of age on the probability of death is negative and significant. Survivors are 1.0% more productive (TFP) than the average plant in the industry and 3.8% more productive that plants that fail (table 3). The marginal effect of our productivity measure on the probability of death is negative and significant.

Besides being large, older, and more productive, surviving plants are more capital and skill intensive than exiting establishments. Survivors are 29% more capital intensive than exits, and the marginal effect of capital intensity on the probability of death is negative and strongly significant. Similarly, both types of wages are significantly higher at surviving plants, 2%–13% in each case. The probit estimates show a strong negative relationship between log wages and the probability of plant shutdown.

Finally, we look at plant characteristics related to products and markets. As seen in table 3, surviving plants are much more likely to be exporters (22.1%) than are failing plants (12.1%). The results from the unconditional probit show that exporting by the plant is associated with a 12.6-percentage-point reduction in the probability of death, even when controlling for industry. This magnitude is enormous given that the unconditional average probability of death is 26.9%. Of survivors, 67.6% produce multiple products, while 54.7% of deaths do. Relative to single-product establishments, multire product plants have a failure probability that is 9.1 to 11.5 percentage points lower.

Previous studies have shown that plant death rates vary substantially across industries, and we also find evidence for industry-level variation in death probabilities. The mean of our industry entry cost measure for deaths and survivors is given in table 3. As expected, industry entry costs are significantly lower on average for plants that die, 0.645, than for plants that survive, 0.681. The marginal effect on the probability of death for the average plant is large, negative, and significant.

### C. Plant Characteristics at Multiplant and Multinational Firms

In every case, our results strongly support the hypothesis that firm characteristics are associated with differences in plant outcomes. In particular, we find that all three firm attributes, ownership by a multplant firm, ownership by a U.S. multinational, or a recent ownership change, are associated with lower shutdown rates. However, we caution that all these results on firm ownership are unconditional and do not establish a causal link between the firm attributes and increased survival probabilities. For example, we cannot conclude that multinational ownership conveys benefits to a plant in the form of increased survival. In particular, plants that are part of larger firms and are part of multinational groups also have “good” plant characteristics.

Size, age, productivity, capital intensity, export status, and wages are all positively and significantly correlated with each of the firm measures. Table 5 shows the means of

---

**Table 5.—Plant Characteristics by Firm Type**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Multinationals</th>
<th>Single Plant Firms</th>
<th>Multiplant Firms</th>
<th>Non-U.S. Multinationals</th>
<th>U.S. Multinationals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size (log employment)</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>4.30</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>5.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>10.70</td>
<td>14.69</td>
<td>11.95</td>
<td>16.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital intensity (log K/L)</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>3.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production wage (log)</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>2.81</td>
<td>3.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonproduction wage (log)</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>3.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total factor productivity (log)</td>
<td>$-0.02$</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exporter (% of plants)</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>144,150</td>
<td>91,942</td>
<td>220,879</td>
<td>15,213</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers represent the mean across plants within the category for 1987 and 1992. All the single-plant and multiplant means are significantly different at the 1% level. Similarly, all the multinational and non-multinational means are significantly different at the 1% level.
these variables by ownership type. Establishments that are part of a multiplant firm are larger (125%)\(^\text{16}\) and older (three years) than standalone establishments. In addition, plants that are part of a larger group are more capital intensive (70%), pay higher wages (13%–14%), are more productive (4%), and are far more likely to be exporters (29% versus 13%) than solo plants.

Multinational ownership is associated with even larger differences in these important plant characteristics.\(^\text{17}\) Multinational plants are far larger (149%), older (4.6 years), and more productive (6%) than non-multinational plants. They are substantially more capital intensive (89%) and pay higher wages (14%–20%); and 50% of multinational plants export as opposed to 17% of non-multinationals. Table 6 reports the correlations across plant characteristics, including ownership. Ownership by a U.S. multinational or a multiplant firm is positively and significantly correlated with all the plant attributes known to improve plant survival. In the next section, we control for the attributes of the plant and attempt to isolate the effects of firm structure on plant shutdowns.

### V. Plant Shutdowns and Firm Structure—Conditional

Table 7 reports our multivariate specification pooled across years for all plants in the sample. We estimate a probit of the form

\[
\Pr(D_{it} = 1 | \mathbf{Z}_i) = \Phi(c_i + c_r + \beta Z_{it} + \beta' Z_{it} + \beta Z_i),
\]

where \(Z_{it}, Z_{ip}, \text{ and } Z_i\) are the vectors of firm, plant, and region/industry characteristics in year \(t\), and \(c_i\) and \(c_r\) are full sets of year and region dummies. The probits are run on the full sample of plants from 1987 to 1997. We report seven variations with and without industry entry costs and industry fixed effects. Standard errors are robust to repeated observations on individual plants. All plant, industry, and region characteristics are included along with our measures of firm structure and year dummies. The reported numbers are the change in the probability of death for a marginal increase in the independent variable.

#### A. Firm Characteristics

Relative to the unconditional results reported in section IVA, we find substantial changes in the role of firm characteristics in shutdowns once we condition on plant characteristics. Unconditionally, plants that are part of a multiplant firm are less likely to be shut down than single-plant firms. However, this is driven entirely by the “good” characteristics of plants that are part of larger firms. Controlling for plant size, age, factor intensity, and so on, we find that being part of a larger firm significantly increases the probability of death at the margin by 7.9 percentage points. Adding the entry cost control increases the estimate to 9.2 percentage points (column III). These estimates represent large increases in the probability of closure, a 29% to 34% increase for the average plant in the sample.

We check to see if this result is driven by the dissimilarity of the plants to the firms. However, adding the measure of dissimilarity, we still find a positive and significant coefficient on the multiplant dummy. Across our specifications, we find plants that are part of a multiplant firm have death probabilities from 3.0 to 5.0 percentage points higher even when they are identical to the other plants in the firm. In addition, the coefficient on the dissimilarity measure is large, positive, and significant. The average plant at a multiplant firm has a dissimilarity measure of 0.48, which increases the probability of shutdown by more than 2.5 percentage points. At the mean of the dissimilarity measure,
an establishment that is part of a multiplant firm has a probability of shutdown that ranges from 5.9 to 7.2 percentage points higher than a comparable single-plant firm (depending on the specification). Even including both industry fixed effects and industry entry costs (column VI), the dissimilarity coefficient is large, positive, and significant. Finally, we check to see whether this result on cost-structure dissimilarity is being driven by the output of the plant. We include a dummy variable for so-called standalone plants, that is, plants producing in an SIC4 industry that is not found elsewhere in the firm. While these orphan plants within the firm are significantly more likely to be shut down (4.9 percentage points), the role of cost structure remains strong and significant.

The stronger effects for less similar plants match the theoretical predictions from the declining industry literature that diversified firms are more likely to close plants. Multi-plant firms are able and willing to use the plant shutdown margin to adjust employment and output. The difference in the shutdown probability may point to separate sunk costs of entry for the firm and for the plant.\footnote{There remains the possibility that our specification does not include all the relevant plant characteristics; in other words, that the increased probability of shutdown is driven by an attribute found predominantly in the plants of multiplant firms but not available in our data set.}

We next consider whether the multinational status of the owning firm is related to the probability of shutdown. Once again, the unconditional relationship suggests that domestic plants owned by U.S. multinationals have good attributes that make them less likely to fail. Controlling for plant characteristics and other firm ownership characteristics, we find that the marginal effect of U.S. multinational ownership is to increase the probability of exit by 4.5 percentage points (column VII). In addition, almost every multinational is also a multiplant firm. Adding the multinational and multiplant effects, we find that the average plant owned by a U.S. multinational has a shutdown probability that is more than 10 percentage points (or over 40%) higher than a standalone domestic plant with similar features.

This finding on the effects of multinational ownership matches the notion of “footloose” capital proposed by Rodrik (1997). The foreign assets of the multinational firm may increase its flexibility and thus raise the probability that it will close one of its domestic plants. This also matches the evidence of Brainard and Riker (1997a, 1997b) and Braconier and Ekholm (2000) that multinationals have, in

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Multivariate Probits of Plant Death on Characteristics}
\begin{tabular}{lcccccc}
\hline
\textbf{Firm characteristics} & (I) & (II) & (III) & (IV) & (V) & (VI) & (VII) \\
\hline
Multiplant & 0.079*** & 0.030*** & 0.092*** & 0.047*** & 0.050*** & 0.050*** & 0.042*** \\
 & (0.002) & (0.008) & (0.002) & (0.008) & (0.007) & (0.008) & (0.007) \\
Dissimilarity & 0.060*** & 0.053*** & 0.041*** & 0.041*** & 0.041*** & 0.032*** & 0.049*** \\
 & (0.020) & (0.018) & (0.017) & (0.017) & (0.015) & (0.005) & (0.005) \\
Standalone & & & & & & & \\
Multinational & 0.040*** & 0.056*** & 0.036*** & 0.051*** & 0.042*** & 0.043*** & 0.045*** \\
 & (0.005) & (0.005) & (0.005) & (0.005) & (0.005) & (0.005) & (0.005) \\
Takeover & 0.049*** & 0.057*** & 0.048*** & 0.057*** & 0.055*** & 0.055*** & 0.054*** \\
 & (0.004) & (0.004) & (0.004) & (0.004) & (0.004) & (0.004) & (0.004) \\
\hline
\textbf{Plant characteristics} & & & & & & & \\
Size (log employment) & -0.043*** & -0.040*** & -0.043*** & -0.039*** & -0.053*** & -0.053*** & -0.053*** \\
 & (0.001) & (0.001) & (0.001) & (0.001) & (0.001) & (0.001) & (0.001) \\
Age & -0.004*** & -0.004*** & -0.004*** & -0.004*** & -0.004*** & -0.004*** & -0.004*** \\
 & (0.000) & (0.000) & (0.000) & (0.000) & (0.000) & (0.000) & (0.000) \\
Capital intensity (log K/L) & -0.023*** & -0.021*** & -0.012*** & -0.010*** & -0.005*** & -0.005*** & -0.005*** \\
 & (0.001) & (0.001) & (0.001) & (0.001) & (0.001) & (0.001) & (0.001) \\
Nonproduction wage (log) & -0.028*** & -0.031*** & -0.027*** & -0.029*** & -0.039*** & -0.038*** & -0.039*** \\
 & (0.002) & (0.002) & (0.002) & (0.002) & (0.002) & (0.002) & (0.002) \\
Production wage (log) & -0.061*** & -0.061*** & -0.051*** & -0.052*** & -0.055*** & -0.055*** & -0.054*** \\
 & (0.003) & (0.003) & (0.003) & (0.003) & (0.003) & (0.003) & (0.003) \\
Total factor productivity (log) & -0.056*** & -0.048*** & -0.060*** & -0.053*** & -0.048*** & -0.048*** & -0.048*** \\
 & (0.003) & (0.003) & (0.003) & (0.003) & (0.003) & (0.003) & (0.003) \\
Multiproduct plant & -0.058*** & -0.057*** & -0.051*** & -0.050*** & -0.043*** & -0.043*** & -0.043*** \\
 & (0.002) & (0.002) & (0.002) & (0.002) & (0.002) & (0.002) & (0.002) \\
Exporter & -0.056*** & -0.058*** & -0.052*** & -0.054*** & -0.066*** & -0.067*** & -0.068*** \\
 & (0.003) & (0.003) & (0.003) & (0.003) & (0.003) & (0.003) & (0.003) \\
\hline
\textbf{Industry characteristics} & & & & & & & \\
Entry cost & -0.484*** & -0.473*** & -0.505*** & -0.506*** & -0.506*** & -0.506*** & -0.506*** \\
 & (0.012) & (0.012) & (0.012) & (0.012) & (0.012) & (0.012) & (0.012) \\
Industry fixed effects & No & No & No & Yes & Yes & Yes & Yes \\
Region fixed effects & Yes & Yes & Yes & Yes & Yes & Yes & Yes \\
Year fixed effects & Yes & Yes & Yes & Yes & Yes & Yes & Yes \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textit{Note:} The coefficients give the marginal effect of changing the independent variable. Industry dummies are calculated at the four-digit SIC level. Region dummies correspond to Labor Market Areas. All specifications have 236,092 observations. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the plant level. ***indicates the coefficient is significant at the 1% level.
effect, an increased elasticity of labor demand due to their ability to shift production across locations within the firm.

Ownership changes at the plant show a similar pattern. Plants that have experienced a change in ownership in the previous five-year period have characteristics that decrease their probability of death. This suggests that ownership changes typically occur at good plants. However, controlling for plant attributes, we find that takeover targets are more likely to fail than plants with unchanged ownership. The effect of an ownership change is quite large, 5.4 percentage points (column VII). With our data, we cannot distinguish the source of this negative effect. One possibility is that the dramatically higher probability of shutting down is related to an unexpectedly poor match between the plant and the acquiring firm. Alternatively, the firm may have acquired the plant in order to shut it down, that is, a planned rationalization of capacity.

B. Plant and Industry

In this section, we briefly summarize the results on the plant and industry controls. As expected, the probability of plant shutdown remains significantly decreasing in plant age, plant size, and plant productivity. As expected, higher industry entry costs also decrease the probability of failure. Increasing plant size by one standard deviation reduces the probability of shutdown by 4.8 percentage points, and a comparable increase in age is associated with a 3.3 percentage-point drop. The probability of death falls 1.7 percentage points for a one-standard-deviation increase in productivity.

Even controlling for age, size, and productivity, we find significant roles for plant factor intensity in the shutdown decision. Both capital- and skill-intensive plants are less likely to die. The capital-labor ratio, production worker wage, and nonproduction worker wage are all significantly negatively associated with plant failure.

Both unconditionally and conditionally, plants that produce more products have lower probabilities of failure. Multiple product facilities have shutdown probabilities 4.3 percentage points lower than single-product plants. Exporting by the plant remains strongly positively associated with plant survival. Conditional on all the other variables, the probability of death at exporters is 6.8 percentage points lower than at nonexporters. The sign of the export variable is unchanged from the unconditional regressions reported above. This result on exporting matches the predictions of the selection and survival models of Melitz (2003) and Bernard et al. (2003) and suggests either that exporting has a direct positive effect on survival or that exporting is correlated with other unobserved characteristics of the plant that increase survival.

19 Using the coefficients from column VII in table 7, the change in probability is calculated with all variables at their sample means, increasing only the relevant variable.

VI. Conclusions

This paper has examined the role of firms in the decision to close a plant. We have asked whether multiplant and multinational firms differ from standalone or domestic firms in their decision to close a plant.

We find that the nature of the firm plays a crucial role in plant shutdowns. Plants that are part of a larger firm are unconditionally far less likely to shut down than a single-plant firm. Similarly, plants owned by a U.S. multinational are less likely to close. Finally, plants that have changed ownership also die less often.

However, we also show that plants owned by a multiplant firm or by a U.S. multinational have a range of good characteristics that make them more likely to survive. These plants are larger, older, more productive, and more likely to export, employ more capital and more skilled workers, and operate in industries with lower shutdown probabilities. Once we condition on this array of good plant characteristics, we find that multiplant firms are actually more likely to close a plant. This is particularly true if the plant is different from the rest of the firm in terms of its factor intensities in production.

We also find strong evidence that ownership by a U.S. multinational significantly increases the shutdown probability of a domestic plant conditional on plant characteristics. Even controlling for the fact that almost every U.S. multinational is also a multiplant firm, we find that the conditional closure probability is higher at these plants. Finally, conditioning on the plant’s qualities, we find that a new owner is significantly more likely to close a recent acquisition.

We also extend the current literature on plant attributes and plant failure. While size, age, and productivity improve plant survival, so too do the capital and skill intensities of the plant. In addition, we find that exporters and multiproduct plants are much more likely to survive over a five-year interval than nonexporters or single-product establishments.

Our results have implications for future research in a number of areas. Additional theoretical and empirical work is needed to develop a deeper understanding of the nature of the shutdown decision in multiunit firms, especially those that cross borders. The rapid growth in multinational activity around the world and in the U.S. economy over the past decade only increases the importance of understanding decision-making in these firms. Models with heterogeneous firms have become increasingly important in areas such as industrial organization and international trade. Dynamic firm-based models of productivity growth and survival must be augmented to recognize the multiplant, multiproduct, multimarket nature of the firm, especially given their importance in the overall economy and in manufacturing. Our findings suggest that multunit, multinational firms have greater flexibility in adjusting to changing market conditions than do single-plant, domestic firms. Decisions about labor market adjustments at these firms (both at the exten-
sive and intensive margins) will likely differ from those at purely domestic firms.

REFERENCES


Data Appendix

The data in this paper come from the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD) of the Bureau of the Census. We use data from the Censuses of Manufactures (CM) starting in 1987 and continuing through 1997. The sampling unit for the Census is a manufacturing establishment, or plant, and the sampling frame in each Census year includes detailed information on inputs, output, and ownership on all establishments.

Variables

Size—The log of plant total employment

Age—the difference between the current year and the first recorded Census year for the plant, starting with the 1963 Census. Plants that are in their first Census year are given an age of zero.

Productivity—We estimate a simple five-input production function in logs allowing the coefficients to vary across industries and years,

\[
\ln Y_{it} = c_0 + \sum_{j} \beta_j \ln X_{ijt} + \epsilon_{it}
\]

(A1)

where Y is gross output of the plant in year t, and the five inputs are the number of production and nonproduction workers at the plant, the book value of machinery and equipment, the book value of buildings and structures, and the value of purchased inputs and energy. We use \( \epsilon_{it} \) as our measure of plant total factor productivity. By construction the measure is mean zero for each industry in each period. We recognize that this measure may have problems with comovement of markups and productivity, or the comovements of variable inputs and productivity. Using a productivity measure based on industry cost shares did not change the results.

Capital intensity—The log of the capital-labor ratio, where capital is the book value of machinery, equipment, buildings, and structures.
Production wage—The log of the average wage paid to production workers at the plant.
Nonproduction wage—The log of the average wage paid to nonproduction workers at the plant.
Export—An indicator variable that is 1 when the plant exports and 0 otherwise.
Products—The number of products produced at the plant, where a product is defined as a five-digit 1987 SIC product-class. The probits include a dummy variable for plants that produce multiple products.
Entry costs—Recent equilibrium models of industries with heterogeneous firms predict that, in steady state, entry and exit rates will covary exactly as sunk entry costs change. If all our industries were in steady state, we could use the industry entry rate to proxy for industry sunk costs in our plant shutdown equation. In practice, of course, some industries are growing and others are declining, leading to important differences in the two margins. We use the comovement of the two rates across industries to develop an entry cost measure. Our measure of industry entry costs is based on the minimum of the entry and exit rates in a five-year interval,

\[ EC_{it} = 1 - \{\min(\text{entryrate}_{it}, \text{exitrate}_{it})\} \]

Contracting industries by definition will have higher exit rates than entry rates. However, a contracting industry with low entry costs will have a higher entry rate. Conversely, an expanding industry with relatively low entry costs will have fewer plant deaths and a lower exit rate.

\footnote{We thank Marc Melitz for suggesting this measure. Our measure is similar to one calculated by Dunne and Roberts (1991), who find their measure of “producer volatility” is both more pronounced and more persistent than entry, exit, or net entry, suggesting it is a good proxy for sunk costs.}